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Abstract
In a traditional system of exogamous and patrilocal marriage prevalent in much of Sub-
Saharan Africa, when she marries, a rural woman typically leaves her kin to reside with her
husband living outside her natal village. Since a village that allows a widow to inherit her late
husband's land can provide her with old age security, single females living outside the village
are more likely to marry into the village. Using a natural experimental setting, provided by
the longitudinal household panel data drawn from rural Tanzania for the period from 1991 to
2004, during which several villages that initially banned a widow's land inheritance removed
this discrimination, this study provides evidence in support of this view, whereby altering a
customary land inheritance rules in a village in favor of widows increased the probability of
males marrying in that village. This ¯nding suggests that providing rural women with old age
protection (e.g., insurance, livelihood protection) has remarkable spatial and temporal welfare
e®ects by in°uencing their decision to marry.
Keywords: Demography, Gender empowerment, Land ownership, Social custom, Social security, Widowhood
JEL classi¯cation: J12, J14, K11, Q15, R23
1 Introduction
Old age security is a global concern of paramount importance for men and women alike, in both
developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, it has a far more serious impact on the welfare
of women in the developing world, not only because social security programs provided by the
government are often in their early stages in less advanced economies, but also due to the fact
that, in such economies, women are highly discriminated against with respect to the access to
political and socio-economic opportunities.
Despite its evident signi¯cance, during the last decade, this issue has not been high on the
development agenda. Thus, only recently, the international society has devoted more e®ort to
¤I thank Yutaka Arimoto, Joachim De Weerdt, Christelle Dumas, Seiro Ito, Hyejin Ku, Tomohiro Machikita,
Momoe Makino, Tomoya Matsumoto, Kazunari Tsukada, and participants at the NEUDC Conference (New Haven,
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2012), and seminars at GRIPS, Hitotsubashi and the IDE-JETRO for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial
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providing residents of low- and middle-income countries with better social protection, as re°ected
in the UN Social Protection Floor Initiative. One reason for this lack of prior interest may stem
from a great di±culty in demonstrating empirically how providing old age security shapes socio-
economic outcomes, which is likely associated with researchers' inability to provide subjects with
old age insurance in a randomly controlled experiment they conduct for their studies.1 As a result,
researchers have to patiently watch for the timing that the government in developing countries
introduces social protection programs, such as pension plans, for the impact evaluation (Morduch,
1999, p.192). Hence, it is not surprising that there is paucity of research in this area, with only a
few empirical studies exploring in°uence of social protection programs on, for example, children's
welfare outcomes and the pattern of a household's labor supply and expenditures in Mexico (Nugent
and Gillaspy, 1983) and South Africa (Bertrand et al., 2003; Case and Deaton, 1998; Du°o, 2000,
2003).
The pertinent literature indicates that there are essentially two strategies that may allow women
in developing economies to obtain social protection in their old age, one of which is investing in
their resources from human capital (e.g., children's health and education) to physical capital (e.g.,
land) as well as social capital (e.g., social relationships with relatives and neighbors). In fact,
most previous studies have explored, either empirically or theoretically, the relationship between
parents' old age concern and their investment in childbearing (fertility) or children's health and
education (Hoddinott, 1992; Jensen, 1990; Nugent, 1985; Seebens, 2009; Zhang and Nishimura,
1993). However, this strategy may not be su±cient for revealing the full extent of this issue, as
in less advanced economies women tend to have weak bargaining power within a household. In
such cases, household assets are rarely in the hands of females, who, in some societies, often need
permission from their husbands just to go outside.
For single females, however, ¯nding a prosperous spouse may be an alternative to the mother's
investment strategy. In fact, the relationship between women's old age concern and the pattern of
marital formation or dissolution is often observed in several countries. For instance, it seems that
an increase in gold prices, associated with international sanctions against Iran's Nuclear Program,
has recently led Iranian women that were married against their will, yet were previously hesitant
to seek divorce, to pursue marriage dissolution, as their circumstances had changed favorably. The
main cause of this change in attitude is believed to be the increased value of mehr, a payment
from a husband to a wife conditional on termination of marriage and, in Iran, usually stipulated in
gold coins in prenuptial agreement (BBC, 2012; The New York Times, 2010).2 Another example
from Bangladesh indicates that the enactment of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) of
1961 increased the equilibrium level of mehr, as it provided a husband with a de facto incentive to
o±cially divorce without altering the cost of divorce in case that he desires to separate (Ambrus et
al., 2010). In contrast to the mother's strategy, however, most of these examples only indicate that,
in the developing world, good marriage, indeed, plays an institutional role as a means of women's
old age insurance and, based on the extensive literature review, it appears that, at present, there
is no rigorous empirical research explicitly testing this view. Thus, the current study attempts to
¯ll this knowledge gap.
1Another reason may be the government's preference to allocate limited budget to a policy targeting young
generation over old generation.
2http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/middleeast/07divorce.html?pagewanted=all for the New York
Times and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16813248 for BBC.
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Data used in this study is drawn from a ¯ve-wave long-term household panel survey conducted in
the rural region in northwest Tanzania, Kagera (Kagera Health and Development Survey, KHDS).
The ¯rst four waves were carried out 6 to 7 months apart during the period between 1991 and
1994, with the ¯nal wave carried out in 2004. Historically, whether a widow can inherit her late
husband's land has depended upon a customary rule imposed by each village in rural Tanzania,
generating some variation in application of the rule across villages. As the data suggests, although
in 1991 (wave 1) some villages customarily prohibited widows from inheriting land, by 2004 (wave
5) the discrimination was removed in some areas, following the surge of national excitement about
women's land rights in the 1990s. This produces an ideal setting of natural experiment that ¯ts
the purpose of the current study.
In traditional marriage characterized by patrilocal residence and clan exogamy prevailing in
much of Sub-Saharan Africa, when she marries, a rural woman often leaves her kin to reside
with her husband living outside her natal village. Hence, in this region, the choice of partner is
partly equivalent to a decision pertaining to the selection of residence. In addition, women who
get separated from their husbands tend to experience di±culties in earning a living in (or even
returning to) their natal villages, as this sometimes brings con°icts with their male siblings (and
their wives). Moreover, in patriarchal societies, daughters are usually not allowed to inherit any
properties from their fathers. Therefore, in these systems, it is quite likely that single females
would attempt to marry into a village that allows widows to inherit land, because the rule can
provide them with social protection in case of their husband's death. Since external females may
compete with local ones for marrying males living in such a progressive village, this competition
may reduce the cost of getting married for those males (e.g., search cost, bride wealth payments
from a man to a woman's family, which is another prevailing tradition in Sub-Saharan Africa). As
a result, it is expected that the probability of males marrying is higher in a village that permits a
widow's land inheritance than in a village that does not. In line with this view, by exploiting the
above experimental situation, this paper will show that removing discrimination against widows
regarding land inheritance in a village increased the marital probability of males living in the
village.
Implicitly, this hypothesis builds upon an assumption that old age is a remarkable concern
for females in rural Tanzania. Regarding this point, Figure 1 presents the proportion of wedded
population by age and sex, based upon data sourced from Tanzania Population and Housing Census
2002. For example, approximately 24% of females aged 15-19 years were formally married or living
together with their partners in contrast to the corresponding ¯gure of 3% for males, suggesting that
women marry younger than males do. However, there were fewer females aged 35 years or above
that were in the wedded relationship compared to males, suggesting that women's separation from
their husbands starts around that age and is partly driven by a husband's death resulting from
commonly observed age di®erences between spouses3 and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).4
Combining these ¯ndings with women's life expectancy at birth, which was 51.04 years in 2002
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2006) and the median age at ¯rst marriage among women aged
3A husband was on average older than his wife by 8-10 years in Tanzania in 1996 (Westo®, 2003).
4Kagera is one of the areas most severely a®ected by HIV/AIDS. Beegle (2005) used the data drawn from the
¯rst four waves of the KHDS to investigate how prime-age (15-50) adult mortality (past and future) a®ected the
time allocation of household members. In a similar vein, the impact of adult mortality shocks on the consumption
growth of household members was also investigated by using all the full dataset of the KHDS (Beegle et al., 2008).
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20-49 years, 18.3 years in 2004-2005 (National Bureau of Statistics and ORC Macro, 2005),5 it
appears that women must anticipate relatively long periods of widowhood when they marry.6 This
may suggest that old age security is a signi¯cant concern for females in this country.7 Another
serious example that may highlight the importance of women's old age concern in this country
is witch killing - a frequently reported social problem in northern Tanzania (BBC, 1999, 2002;
Miguel, 2005), whereby the victims are often elderly widowed women.8
The analysis presented here is limited to the sample respondents who were (single) males aged 5
to 18 years in wave 1 that lived in a village throughout the sample periods, which prohibited widows
from inheriting land in wave 1. Making a comparison of the subsequent marital probability of these
males between villages - which eliminated the discrimination (treatment villages) and villages that
did not (control villages) - enables this study to explore the pattern of women's marriage-related
relocation motivated by their old age concern. Despite this ideal natural experimental setting, it
appears that changes in the inheritance rule were not randomly distributed across villages. To
address this endogeneity, this research primarily takes a di®erences-in-di®erences (DID) approach,
together with a two-step method, following Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006). The method the
authors implemented allows this study to explicitly control for village-¯xed e®ects, as well as
identify the impact of removing the discrimination by using the di®ering e®ects by gender.
In rural societies in the developing world, women work very hard. They engage in predominantly
domestic activities (e.g., preparation for meals, collection of ¯rewood, and fetching of water), as
well as agricultural work, which often considerably exceeds that performed by males. Therefore,
their marriage-related migration implies a spatial allocation of productive labor-power as well
as a formation of new production units (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2008). Moreover, their
relocation could inter-temporally a®ect the distribution of welfare, because they reproduce the
labor of next generation. Consequently, providing rural women with old age protection (e.g.,
insurance, livelihood protection) will have remarkable temporal and spatial welfare e®ects, by
in°uencing their decision to marry, which is a primary policy implication from the current study.
Recent policy e®orts for empowering women in developing countries may be broadly classi¯ed
into those pertaining to social and cultural factors and those that act on their rational behavior,
with the former emphasizing raising awareness, and the latter focusing on the role of economic
incentives. In this context, the current study contributes to this policy debate by providing further
support for the second approach (Jensen and Oster, 2009; Jensen, 2012), because it is expected that
the ¯ndings of this study will show that women are highly responsive to the changes in (expected)
economic returns in their old age (although this does not imply that the ¯rst approach is ine®ective).
However, when taking this approach, it should be noted that having a full understanding of the role
played by existing social institutions is necessary. In the current context, it seems that reforming a
land tenure system was not expected to a®ect marital sorting. Without an in-depth knowledge of
local institutions (in this study, primarily clan exogamy and patrilocality), there would be danger
5Men's life expectancy at birth was reported as 50.99 years in the 2002 census. These ¯gures could vary by
the source of data. For example, life expectancy at birth in 2004 was 46 years, based upon Africa Development
Indicators in 2004 (World Bank, 2006).
6These ¯gures suggest that females who get married at the age of 20 years have to live as widows for almost half
of their life following their ¯rst husband's death.
7When a husband dies early, following his death, women may not necessarily resume their `old' life. However, as
few females would expect their husbands to die early when they get married, their concern about social security in
their life following their husband's death is primarily related to resuming their old life.
8http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/386550.stm for BBC (1999) and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
2372907.stm for BBC (2002).
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that any policy intervention unintentionally changes the pattern of economic development.
Another policy implication may also reach practitioners challenging several traditional marital
practices (e.g., early marriage, polygamy) often observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. As the current
study will show that a marriage market operates across neighboring villages, any potential pol-
icy interventions for addressing those issues should be spatially extensive, although an optimal
geographical scope of those interventions could not be established in this study.
This paper mainly contributes to three strands of the extant literature.9 Firstly, this study will
suggest that political shocks to the cost of life security in the future change the current marital
behavior of women and thus the pattern of matching in a marriage market. This view is taken,
as the current study will show that providing widows with a right to inherit land can a®ect a
marital decision of single females of the current generation by reducing the expected cost of being
widowed. In this sense, this study reveals a parallel to the literature sources reporting the link
between socio-economic shocks and adjustments in a marriage market (e.g., Gruber, 2004; Peters,
2011; Ueyama and Yamauchi, 2009). However, this similarity largely exists in terms of the quantity
of matching (i.e., probability), rather than the quality (e.g., hypergamy) due to the limitations
imposed by the data this study relies on for the analysis (Abramitzky et al., 2011).10 Secondly,
the research on the manner in which traditional institutions can shape socio-economic outcomes
in the modern world has been growing since the study conducted by Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2006). For example, by exploiting a unique setting of tea plantation in South India, Luke and
Munshi (2011) showed that e®ects of an increase in women's bargaining power within a household,
driven by economic globalization, on children's educational attainment and marriage varied by
caste groups. The current study follows this line of research by investigating how introducing a
modern inheritance system in°uences the pattern of forming marital unions in agrarian societies
where traditions of clan exogamy and patrilocality are still prevailing. Finally, a few studies have
empirically explored the link between women's marriage and migration, despite the signi¯cant
correlation. For instance, Rosenzweigh and Stark (1989) showed that women's migration motivated
by marriage, which accounted for a signi¯cant proportion of migration in rural India, could be
seen as an inter-household contractual arrangement, aimed at mitigating income risks as well as
facilitating consumption smoothing. In contrast to their study, which was implicitly based on a
unitary-household model, the current research will highlight the importance of a woman's (rather
than household's) old age concern as a motivator behind her relocation driven by marriage in rural
Tanzania.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background
on marital practices and land ownership in Tanzania. An empirical strategy is discussed in Section
3, followed by data overview given in Section 4. The ¯ndings of this paper are presented in Section
5, with conclusions summarized in Section 6.
[Here, Figure 1]
9More generally, this research also relates to many development studies, such as those examining impacts of
empowering women (e.g., Allendorf, 2007; Du°o, forthcoming); those exploring impacts of reforming a land tenure
policy (e.g., Gibson and Gurmu, 2011; Roy, 2012); and those investigating the role of traditional institutions in the
process of economic development (e.g., La Ferrara, 2007; Luke and Munshi, 2006).
10I wish to thank Ran Abramitzky for introducing his paper to me.
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2 Institutional Background
Largely sourced from Gopal and Salim (1998), Killian (2011) and Rwebangira (1996), this section
brie°y explains institutional background on marriage, land, rules of land inheritance, and women's
land rights movement in the 1990s.
2.1 Marriage and Land
In Tanzania, marriage tends to be patrilocal, with a wife moving into her husband's family. In addi-
tion, exogamous marriage, prevalent in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, prevents a man from marrying
a woman from his own clan. This combination of patrilocal residence and exogamous marriage
often forces a rural wife to move some distance away from her natal village to her husband's home,
with a customary payment of bride wealth in the hands of her parents.
Marriage can be seen as a formation of new production unit and rural women, who are respon-
sible for almost all housework (e.g., preparing for food, gathering ¯rewood and carrying water,
weeding, sowing and harvesting crops, grinding, pounding and milling grains, and caring for chil-
dren and ill household members), devote most of their productive time to the unit. Despite women's
signi¯cant contribution, historically, males were the sole custodians of matrimonial properties and
children, whereby women would often receive minimal rewards from their e®orts in their marital
relationship. To overcome this disadvantages caused by married women's legal status, the Law
of Marriage Act (LMA) was enacted in 1971. This Act secured women's basic rights in marriage
and divorce by providing for forms of marriage, minimum age of marriage (18 for males and 15
for females), separate ownership of properties between spouses during marriage, child custody,
and maintenance and division of matrimonial assets upon divorce or separation (Tenga and Peter,
1996). Although customary rules and traditional norms still continue to a®ect people's attitudes
and practices, the enactment of the LMA was seen as a landmark in an attempt to improve
women's legal status in Africa. However, as the LMA does not provide for inheritance of matri-
monial properties by widowed women, their inheritance rights are excluded from the protection of
this Act.
In contemporary Tanzania, all rights pertaining to land ownership, i.e. `radical title', have
been vested in the President in trust for the whole nation since the independence. This principle
essentially stems from colonial land tenure policies exploited by the British Government (1922-
1961), whereby there is no freehold form of land tenure, and landholders possess only leaseholds of
a speci¯ed duration. Consequently, land matters of the people, such as acquiring, using, disposing
of and bequeathing, are taken in the sense of the `right of occupancy'. Any disputes related to
land are initially dealt with at a village council, which has substantial power at the local level,
before they come before the primary court (and subsequently the district or high court, in case of
an appeal).
2.2 Inheritance Law and Women's Rights
Whilst the picture should not be over-simpli¯ed, the inheritance of estates is primarily governed
by three di®erent laws in Tanzania: Customary, Islamic, and Statutory laws. These laws provide
for both testate and intestate succession and each of these legal systems is connected by ethnicity
and religious a±nity. In practice, however, Islamic and Statutory are superseded by Customary
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Law, which applies to the majority of Africans living in rural areas.
Customary Law is essentially contained in the Customary Law Declaration Order (CLDO) 1963
(Government Notice No. 436 of 1963), which codi¯es rules relating to inheritance, although cus-
tomary practices in the allocation, use, and transfer of land are more °exible than those stipulated
in the CLDO. The CLDO applies to patrilineal communities, constituting about 80 percent of
Tanzania's ethnic diversity (Rwebangira, 1996, p.25), in which succession is passed down the male
line.11
Together with unwritten social rules derived from shared values and traditions in a community,
the CLDO discriminates against women with respect to the ownership and control of land, despite
the fact that women provide 60 to 80 percent of labor required for farming activities in the country
(Kameri-Mbote, 1992, p.7). With the deceased's ¯rst son receiving the greatest share, followed by
all the other sons, if any, daughters are least favored in the allocation and inheritance of clan or
family land.12 This division is driven by the desire to retain clan or family land within the clan
or family, as well as the fear that daughters might transfer it to another clan or family when they
marry out of their natal village. When no male heir exists, or when land was self-acquired by their
late father, daughters have a chance to inherit land, even though this situation is not favored.
Widows are most vulnerable in any property ownership and control, as Rule 27 of the CLDO
provides that \a widow has no share of the inheritance if the deceased left relatives of his own
clan." Since they receive no resources, they usually have to rely on their children for taking care
of them. According to Rule 66A, for example, \(a widow) may claim the right to remain with her
issue in a house of the deceased, and thus become one of the deceased's kinsfolk." However, tying a
widow's rights to her children's rights in this way does not necessarily protect her, as it invariably
brings practical con°icts in case of polygynous marriage and/or when a widow has daughters only.
Alternatively, a widow has a right to be inherited to any relative of the deceased as a wife (Rule
66A). However, this forces her to be a dependant on her new family, irrespective of the number
of years she has lived with her late husband and the size of her contribution to the wealth of her
previous family. Some leniency in the CLDO protects a childless widow by enabling her to enjoy
user rights pertaining to land, half of the perennial crops, and right of residence until she remarries
or dies. However, this presumes a very rare case in which a married couple keeps a monogamous
relationship in face of social pressure to produce an heir. Since a husband usually tends to beget
children through polygamy or adultery, it must be di±cult for a childless widow to obtain any
form of protection. Moreover, in some societies, a childless widow might also face opprobrium as
a witch. In sum, a widow is most discriminated against among members of Tanzanian society
regarding the use and inheritance of properties by Customary Law.
2.3 Women's Land Rights Movement
The introduction of a multi-party system in 1992 opened up opportunities for women to form inde-
pendent civil society organizations (CSOs). Through advocacy and lobbying, these CSOs brought
11The remaining 20 percent is matrilineal, where the unmodi¯ed customary rules remain in force. In matrilineal
communities, a male heir inherits the property of his maternal uncle, rather than the property of his mother
(Rwebangira, 1996, p.25).
12Based upon the CLDO, land can be classi¯ed as: clan land, family land, and self-acquired land, whereby the
clan land is a piece of land vested in the clan, the family land is a piece of land that an individual of the same
family lineage held title to in the past, and the self-acquired land is a piece of land that an individual or family has
obtained at the cost of their e®orts.
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gender-oriented perspectives in policies and legislation in various spheres, such as education, em-
ployment, and political participation.13
Regarding women's land rights, a coalition called the Gender Land Task Force (GLTF), consist-
ing of the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA) and six other organizations, emerged
in 1997 in the way of challenging the National Land Policy of 1995 and the Land Bill of 1996.14
The National Land Policy and the Land Bill were adopted as a result of the government's e®orts
to introduce legal reforms in a land tenure system. Under the proposed new legal system, however,
the radical title of land remained vested in the President, which continued to leave possibilities
for the government to use any piece of land for the public interest (e.g., alienate land from indige-
nous pastoralists and small-scale farmers to foreigners), and a pluralistic legal system - including
Customary, Islamic, and Statutory laws - remained after the adoption. Consequently, these le-
gal reforms did not take a fundamental departure from the existent principles, retaining women's
disadvantage in accessing and owning land.15
The GLTF adopted several strategies to lobby for the changes in the Land Bill. The Tanza-
nian Media Women's Association (TAMWA), one of those six organizations, for example, used
the media, such as radio, television and newspapers, to inform the public of the de¯ciencies in
the Land Bill. To agitate against a discriminatory customary land tenure system, other organiza-
tions directed campaigns and distributed °iers and bulletins to a variety of stakeholders. Seminars
and workshops involving various entities, including government o±cials, MPs, CSOs, and religious
institutions, were also held in many places in the country to facilitate women's land rights move-
ment. Moreover, the GLTF collaborated with another lobbying group, the National Land Forum
(NALAF).16 As the primary goal of the NALAF was to empower marginalized groups - primarily
pastoralists, peasants, children, the disabled and women - by removing the radical title vested in
the President, the GLTF and NALAF overlapped in their aims and strategies. Religious organi-
zations were also involved in the movement led by both the GLTF and NALAF. Whilst religious
groups had to be very cautious in their actions, as the secular neutrality of the state bans political
grouping along religious lines, they also contributed to encouraging a national debate about the
Land Bill.17
13For example, through an a±rmative action of special seats arrangement, the number of women in parliament
increased from 37 in 1995 to 48 in 2000, and 75 in 2005, resulting in 30 percent share of all the current MPs (Killian,
2011, p. 25).
14The six CSOs included the Tanzanian Media Women's Association (TAMWA), the Women's Advancement
Trust (WAT), the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC), the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP),
the National Organization for Children, Welfare and Human Relief (NOCHU), and the Tanzania Home Economics
Association (TAHEA).
15 Before adopting the National Land Policy and the Land Bill, the government formed a Land Commission
in 1991, headed by Issa G. Shivji - one of Africa's leading experts on law and development issues - to inquire
into a land tenure system in the country. After a thoroughgoing investigation of all twenty regions of mainland
Tanzania and a couple of neighboring countries, the Land Commission submitted to the President a two-volume
report, including a series of recommendations. The essence of the report was to democratize land tenure systems
by detaching land ownership and administration from civil servants. The report rejected the radical title currently
vested in the President and recommended that land matters should be left to the parliament and village assemblies.
The recommendations, therefore, had much potential to create room for people to take part in the administration of
land (although these recommendations of the Land Commission did not explicitly address gender issues). However,
since the Shivji report strongly criticized a statist top-down institutional structure in land management, many of
its recommendations were ¯nally disregarded in the Land Policy and the Land Bill (Manji, 1998).
16The NALAF aimed at pushing for the implementation of Shivji's Land Commission recommendations (see
footnote 15) and was led by Haki Ardhi, a CSO founded by Shivji.
17Despite its diverse ethnicity and religions, Tanzania is a highly uni¯ed country, characterized by harmony and
civic peace, due to a number of contributing factors, one of which is the use of one national language, Swahili. In
addition, Tanzanian constitution prohibits religious bodies from being a part of activities of the state authority.
This secular neutrality of the state might also be another factor.
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All these movements eventually succeeded in obtaining real improvements of the Land Act
of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999, both characterized by a number of gender-neutral
aspects. For example, it is provided that males and females should enjoy equal rights pertaining
to acquisition, use and transfer of land. In addition, disposing of land is not allowed without the
consent of both (or all) spouses as occupiers. Moreover, both acts override Customary Law, if
the latter prohibits marginalized groups, such as women, children, and the disabled, from using,
owning, and transferring land.
For these acts to be observed and enforced strictly, however, an appropriate monitoring system
is needed. Further issues can also arise from the CLDO of 1963, as it has not yet been repealed in
spite of numerous discriminatory rules related to land against women. This leaves some ambiguities
in applying these acts to real life situations. Moreover, these improvements might not have fully
mobilized rural women, who are most a®ected by customary rules detrimental to them, as the
majority of them may not be well informed of these legal reforms. Despite the two acts of 1999,
it is likely that it will take some time for the e®ect to be fully realized. Nevertheless, it is true
that women's land rights movement °ourished in the 1990s and, since then, the ideology must have
gradually reached out to the grassroots in a society.
3 Empirical Strategy
As noted in Section 4, the primary data used in this paper is drawn from the Kagera Health and
Development Survey (KHDS), which is a longitudinal household panel survey that consists of ¯ve
waves, with the ¯rst four waves carried out between 1991 and 1994 and the ¯nal wave conducted
in 2004.18
While the panel data contains information on both individuals that moved out of their original
villages between the waves 1 and 5 (migrants) and those who did not (non-migrants), this study
limits focuses on male respondents aged 5 to 18 years in wave 1, who lived in a village throughout
the sample periods, which customarily prohibited a widow's land inheritance in wave 1.19 These
selection criteria yielded a sample comprising 281 non-migrant males living in 26 villages.20 The
lower and upper bounds of age stem from the fact that, in Tanzania, 18 is the minimum legal
marrying age for males, which ensures that all male study participants were single in wave 1 and
that males under the age of 5 in wave 1 did not reach the marriageable age by wave 5. The sampled
villages in the KHDS are located a great distance away from each other, thus covering the entire
region of Kagera. Of these 26 villages, 21 enabled a widow to inherit land between waves 1 and 5,
whereas 5 villages did not. The subsequent analysis explored the manner in which an improvement
18Wave 1, September 1991 to May 1992; wave 2, April 1992 to November 1992; wave 3, November 1992 to May
1993; wave 4, June 1993 to January 1994; wave 5, January 2004 to August 2004.
19Note that it is possible to include males who lived in villages that already allowed a widow's land inheritance
in wave 1. However, their inclusion in the data analysis could be another source of bias in the estimations, as it is
highly likely that those progressive villages di®ered from the other villages with respect to unobserved characteristics,
which may a®ect the subsequent probability of males entering into marriages. In order to ensure that the sample
villages used for the estimations are as similar at baseline as possible, the focus of this study is on males who lived
only in non-progressive villages in wave 1. The estimation results based on data pertaining to males living in both
progressive and non-progressive villages at baseline are available from the author if requested.
20The KHDS sample households were, with strati¯cation based on geography and mortality risk, randomly selected
in two stages: selection of villages, followed by the selection of households. In the ¯rst stage, 550 geographical areas
delineated by the 1988 Tanzanian Census were initially classi¯ed into eight strata de¯ned over four agronomic zones
and the level of adult mortality (high and low) in each zone. Next, six or seven villages were selected from each
stratum. See User0s Guide to the Kagera Health and Development Survey Datasets (2004) and Kagera Health
and Development Survey 2004 ¡ Basic Information Document (2006) for details of sampling design.
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in a widow's right between waves 1 and 5 a®ected the marital probability of those males over time.
This section presents an empirical strategy by treating the waves 1 and 5 as periods t and t + 1,
respectively.
For a (single) male i living in a village j in a period t, marital status in a period t + 1 (i.e.,
marital decision between the periods t and t+ 1) is modeled as21
Mijt+1 = I(vM¤ijt > 0); (1)
where I(¢) is an indicator function andMijt+1 takes one if he is married in the period t+1 and zero
otherwise. The variable vM¤ijt is the expected present value of net gains from marriage at baseline
and can be modeled as
vM¤ijt = ®
M
1 + ®
M
2 Dj + ®
M 0
3 xit + ®
M 0
4 xjt + !
M
j + ²ijt; (2)
where Dj is a dummy variable, equal to one for a village that made it possible between the periods
t and t + 1 for a widow to customarily inherit land under the surge of the previously explained
national excitement about women's land rights in the 1990s; xit and xjt contain the determinants
of marital costs and bene¯ts speci¯c to the male and his village at baseline; any time-invariant
unobserved village-level characteristics determining the net gains are measured by !Mj ; and ²ijt
represents a stochastic error. Assuming that a village having a social rule regarding land inheritance
in favor of widows attracts (young) single females from outside the village and that their attempts
to marry males living in the village reduce the cost of marriage incurred by the males (e.g., search
cost, bride wealth payments), it is expected that Dj increases the probability that males living in
the village would enter into marriage (i.e., positive ®M2 ).
For the sake of tractability, this paper primarily estimates the model of (1) and (2) by applying
a linear probability model (LPM) of22
Mijt+1 = ®M1 + ®
M
2 Dj + ®
M 0
3 xit + ®
M 0
4 xjt + !
M
j + ²ijt+1: (3)
In contrast to standard discrete choice models, such as logit and probit, the linear speci¯cation
chosen here enables the predicted probability to lie outside the unit interval. In the estimations,
therefore, the proportion of the predicted values outside the unit interval will be evaluated to ensure
that it does not seriously detract from the e®ectiveness of the LPM. Following Beegle et al. (2011)
and McKenzie et al. (2010), equation (3) may also be seen as a variant of di®erences-in-di®erences
(DID) speci¯cation, as it compares changes in marital status over time (either single to married or
single to single) between treatment and control villages. In this sense, the unobserved !Mj can be
seen as the growth-¯xed e®ects operating at the level of villages.
3.1 Information on Local Settings
For the above hypothesis to be plausible, it must be assumed that, in rural areas, (a) women have
limited access to formal insurance of protecting old age, (b) women are strategically able or willing
to choose their husbands by themselves, and (c) the characteristics of destination villages are well
21Theoretically, it is possible that single males in wave 1 got married and immediately dissolved the marital
relationship between waves 1 and 5. However, since the present analysis is limited to young males (mainly, boys) in
wave 1 and deals with a relatively short period of time (1991-2004), this is very unlikely.
22The results of probit model are available from the author, although implications remain unchanged.
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known to women that are about to marry. While the assumption (a) is quite likely (Mboghoina and
Osberg, 2010), this subsection reports on checks performed in order to verify the other assumptions,
before discussing several empirical challenges in the subsequent subsections 3.2 to 3.5.
With a support from one of the supervisors of the KHDS project (wave 5) and a local NGO advo-
cating with and for the rights of older people, in 2012, the author conducted a short questionnaire-
based survey in Karagwe - one district in Kagera region. After stratifying the district into ¯ve
groups of wards by characteristics of population (ethnicity, wealth, etc.), based upon conversations
with the NGO, this survey selected at least one village from the respective group, resulting in
seven villages, randomly drawn from a list of 114 villages existing in the district.23 In each village,
the author asked 5 or 6 females aged 30 to 40 years about the manner in which their marriages
were formed and conducted, spending half an hour to one hour on interviewing each woman in
an environment where the respondent was alone with the author and the research assistant (for
translation to Swahili), thus ensuring con¯dentiality and increasing data reliability. Almost all
these women entered into marriage between 1991 and 2004. While this survey eventually resulted
in approximately 40 interviews in all selected villages, the interviewed women were not randomly
selected because of the author's limited resources (i.e., convenience sampling). Although this non-
random nature makes it di±cult for the current study to generalize the ¯ndings from this survey,
the obtained data still revealed a common picture about the process of marital formation in the
surveyed area in those days of interest.
Based upon those interviews, marriages formally arranged by a groom's and a bride's parents
hardly existed during the sample periods of the KHDS.24 Commonly, a groom would be introduced
to a bride at a church, a market, or his relatives' residence, and would initiate a process of marriage
by proposing to her. In those days, a woman would often receive many proposals - the interviewed
women reported minimum of 2 and maximum exceeding 20 - from both her neighboring and distant
villages; thus, it was common for females to refuse an unwanted o®er of marriage.25 Most women
selected their husband despite not having many opportunities to meet or talk with him. For
example, about 70% of the interviewed women said that, before getting married, they had met
their husband fewer than 10 times or had known him for less than 3 months. When choosing a
partner, instead, a woman carefully investigated a groom's family through her friends and relatives
living in the groom's village.26 In some cases, a bride herself visited a groom's natal village and
explored the groom's family by talking to his neighbors.
In this survey, the author asked respondents whether each item displayed in Appendix Table
8 was an important consideration when choosing a husband. For example, 91% of the interviewed
women preferred a husband belonging to a di®erent clan, suggesting the signi¯cance of clan ex-
ogamy, which is associated with local preferences to avoid marrying somebody that has close blood
relationship, and women's marriage-related migration in this region.27 While the most important
23Consequently, the sampled villages were located a great distance away from each other, thus covering the entire
district.
24This is consistent with views of researchers and those shared by the NGO sta® members in Dar es Salaam and
Kagera prior to the questionnaire survey.
25While less than half of the interviewed women asked for parents' approval before accepting the marriage proposal,
parents did not have a strong power to force their daughter to choose a husband that they liked.
26When a groom makes a proposal and a bride responds, families on both sides commonly use go-betweens
(mushenga in Swahili), who would often be groom's and bride's relatives (e.g., aunt). During the sample period,
the go-betweens played major roles in the process of marital formation as a messenger between families, a negotiator
of bride prices, and an investigator about a groom's family.
27As a matter of fact, about 65% of the currently married interviewed women were living in a village di®erent
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consideration, as indicated by questionnaire responses, was whether a husband's family was `good'
- in the sense that it did not practice witchcraft and had no criminals or sick members - interest-
ingly, approximately 63% of the interviewed women agreed that whether a husband's family was
considerate enough to allow them to inherit a husband's properties in case of the husband's death
was one of their considerations. Although the author does not intend to place much emphasis
on this answer because of potential response bias, it seems true that a bride did have a way of
collecting information about a groom's family living in a village di®erent from her natal village
and that she strategically chose the best partner. These ¯ndings provide a justi¯cation for the
above assumptions (b) and (c). Taking into account this strategic behavior exhibited by women,
it may be plausible to interpret the positive ®M2 in equation (3) as the con¯rmation that removing
discrimination against widows enabled males who had not previously been particularly attractive
marriage candidates to obtain a wife by o®ering old age protection to women, and that women
strategically accepted that o®er.
In subsection 2.3, it was also argued that women's land rights movement emerged in the 1990s
and the ideology has gradually penetrated through the society. As a matter of fact, approximately
58% of the interviewed females were aware of some activities (e.g., workshops, seminars) aimed at
removing discrimination against women in accessing land rights when their husband proposed to
them, and almost all women recognized such activities during the interviews.
3.2 Measurement Issues about Land Inheritance
In all waves of the KHDS, the survey team asked a group of village leaders whether a wife could
customarily inherit land in the village in the event of her husband's death.28 As this information
is a source of a measure of land inheritance used in this study, a widow's inheritance right may be
measured with noise, which could confound estimations. Thus, it should be noted that excessive
noise may make the measure untenable to an empirical analysis.
Peterman (2011) provides support for the view that observed variation of land inheritance in
the KHDS data is informative for an empirical analysis. By using the same information as the
current study, she investigated the e®ects of a widow's property and inheritance rights on labor
force participation and earnings of women aged 15 to 55 years at baseline. In her preferred model
that controls for an individual's ¯xed e®ects and sample attrition, she found that securing a widow's
rights resulted in an increase in their employment opportunities outside home and their earnings.
Nevertheless, this study cannot rule out the possibility that the rule of land inheritance is
measured with errors. As a matter of fact, only a few groups of the village leaders changed
their answer to the above question from `yes' to `no' (and further `yes') in the ¯rst four waves
- an inconsistency that may be associated with misunderstanding of the question and/or social
desirability or irresponsibility for answering the question. While this discrepancy is di±cult to
interpret, this paper does not discriminate against such answers. Instead, the subsequent analysis
performs all estimations by changing the base period t from wave 1 to 2, 3, and 4. In addition,
even if some measurement errors exist, a key message from this study will be una®ected by this
problem because the estimated positive impact of interest is the lower bound of true ®M2 , provided
that those errors are classical.
from their natal villages, and almost all those women lived in their husband's natal village.
28According to the previously mentioned supervisor of the KHDS project (wave 5), approximately 7 to 8 villagers
were selected in each village for this community survey.
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Furthermore, altering the rule of inheritance at the village level will not necessarily mean that
all households in a village strictly followed the new rule. As data does not contain information
about the application of the new rule at the household level, the ¯ndings of this study are based
on the village-level average of all individual impacts operating at the household level.
3.3 Simultaneity Bias: Correlation between Dj and !
M
j
Another empirical challenge arises from potential correlation between Dj and !Mj . For instance,
assuming that males living in a village close to a city would opt to postpone marriage due to their
exposure to urban attitudes and values, and that the villagers are more generous with women's
rights for the same reason, this generates downward bias on the estimated ®M2 , unless village-level
tastes and preferences for modernity are controlled for. One possible solution to this problem is to
explicitly control for village-¯xed e®ects. However, this strategy cannot simply be taken because
of perfect multicollinearity between Dj and !Mj in equation (3).
Alternatively, this paper takes a two-step approach by following Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006).
In this approach, ¯rstly, the same equation as (3) is modeled for females aged 3 to 15 years in wave
1 as
Mijt+1 = ®F1 + ®
F
2 Dj + ®
F 0
3 xit + ®
F 0
4 xjt + !
F
j + ²ijt: (4)
As the minimum legal age of marriage for females is 15 years, all females included in the analysis
were single in wave 1 and those under the age of 3 years in wave 1 did not reach the marriageable
age by wave 5. In contrast to the male sample, the analysis uses migrants as well as non-migrants,
because the purpose of using this female sample is to explicitly control for unobserved village-
level characteristics in the following second step that might a®ect the probability of marriage.
Consequently, there is no strong reason to restrict the sample to non-migrant females.29 Another
reason for including female migrants as well as non-migrants is to mitigate a potential problem of
sample selection, as discussed in subsection 3.4.
It is possible to anticipate the sign of the estimated impact of Dj , i.e., ®^F2 . Firstly, it is expected
that the ®^F2 is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. As seen in subsection 4.1, female marriage is
highly associated with leaving their natal village. To the extent that all women marry out of
their natal village and that their decision to marry is primarily a®ected by living conditions at the
destination, altering the rule of land inheritance in their original village may not in°uence their
marital probability at all. However, as it should not be assumed that no woman would get married
in her natal village, the estimated sign may alternatively be negative. This is because allowing a
widow's land inheritance in a village may intensify competition among local women by attracting
single females from outside the village. Consequently, those females who intend to marry males
living in their natal village would have di±culty in doing so due to the increase in the level of
competition in a marriage market. All these arguments imply the non-positive ®^F2 .
29Apart from an advantage of mitigating a potential problem of sample selection discussed in subsection 3.4,
however, whether the analysis uses all females or just non-migrant females is irrelevant when applying this two-step
approach, although limiting the sample only into non-migrant females is more likely to result in the negative ®^F2 in
the ¯rst step. This is because allowing a widow's land inheritance in a village is likely to result in attracting single
females from outside the village and encouraging competition in the village, which may make it di±cult for the local
females to ¯nd a marital partner in that village. As seen in subsection 4.1, female marriage is highly associated
with leaving their natal village. If those females who fail to marry out in the presence of the increasing level of
competition primarily stay in their natal village, limiting the sample into non-migrant females in modeling equation
(4) might estimate the negative ®^F2 due to selection bias. In fact, this is true. The estimation results of both the
¯rst and second steps using only non-migrant females are available from the author if requested.
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Given this presumption, the second step uses this gender di®erence in the impact of Dj by
pooling both males and females as30
Mijt+1 = ®F1 + (®
M
1 ¡ ®F1 )gi + (®M2 ¡ ®F2 )Dj ¢ gi + ®F 03 xit (5)
+(®M3 ¡ ®F3 )0xit ¢ gi + (®M4 ¡ ®F4 )0xjt ¢ gi + (!Mj ¡ !Fj )gi + Vj + ²ijt+1;
where gi takes one for males and zero otherwise. Now, equation (5) can explicitly control for village-
¯xed e®ects by using a dummy variable for a village j, i.e., Vj ´ ®F2 Dj + ®F 04 xjt + !Fj .31 Whilst
®M2 can no longer be identi¯ed in equation (5) independently, it is possible to draw inference about
it from the estimated ®M2 ¡ ®F2 by using the gender di®erence in the impact of Dj (within-village
variation). Given that ®^F2 = 0, as discussed in the ¯rst step, the coe±cient on the interaction term
between Dj and gi should identify the impact of altering the inheritance rule in a village on the
marital probability of males living in the village. Even in case of the negative ®^F2 in equation (4),
the estimated ®^M2 in (3) is likely to be free from bias arising from potential correlation between
Dj and !Mj , provided that ®^
M
2 ¡ ®^F2 is close to the coe±cient on the interaction term between Dj
and gi in (5).
Similar to Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), the validity of this approach relies on the assumption
pertaining to the unobserved village-level characteristics that the impacts on an individual's marital
probability do not signi¯cantly di®er by gender, i.e., !Mj = !
F
j .
32 One major concern that may
invalidate this assumption is the male-to-female ratio in a village, which is not contained in data.
This is because the smaller number of males in a village may increase the marital probability
of males, but decrease that of females (Becker, 1981). While the sex-ratio may indeed equally
a®ect marital probability between males and females after controlling for an individual's sex in the
pooling equation - in fact, a few covariates will reveal di®erential e®ects by gender in subsequent
estimations, the assumption may still be strong.
In order to make the assumption appear more plausible, in addition to the village-¯xed e®ects,
a variety of observed village-level characteristics (interacted with the male dummy), which may
correlate with the sex-ratio, are also included in equation (5). To capture the levels of modernity
and economic development in a village that might a®ect marital behavior - for example, population
in a village; whether a village has a bank, a daily market, and a bar or restaurant; and whether
public transportation passes by a village are controlled for. Moreover, the vector xjt also includes
a dummy for a village formed by the villagization program in the 1970s. As described in subsection
4.2, this is expected to capture a village-level preference for women's rights.
Furthermore, in columns (a) to (d) in Appendix Table 9, it was also assessed whether sample
respondents in treatment villages engaged more in particular types of activities at baseline, given
the assumption that the work pattern may be a®ected by the sex-ratio in a village. In the table,
last week's hours per person dedicated to two major activities - self-employed farming and chore
activities (collecting ¯rewood, fetching water, caring for ill household members, preparing meals,
30Equation (5) can be derived by pooling equations (3) and (4) as
Mijt+1 = (®
M
1 + ®
M
2 Dj + ®
M0
3 xit + ®
M0
4 xjt + !
M
j + ²ijt) ¢ gi
+(®F1 + ®
F
2 Dj + ®
F 0
3 xit + ®
F 0
4 xjt + !
F
j + ²ijt) ¢ (1¡ gi):
31Strictly speaking, the impacts of xjt are not ¯xed e®ects, as the vector xjt is time-varying. Since estimating
(5) does not use any time variation across waves, however, it can be treated as ¯xed e®ects in this estimation.
32The jati ¯xed e®ects in their paper correspond to village-¯xed e®ects in the current study. They assumed that
the jati ¯xed e®ects equally a®ected boys and girls after controlling for an individual's sex.
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cleaning house, doing laundry, and shopping for food) - were estimated for males and females aged
7 years or older, separately. The results provided no evidence supporting the view that sample
respondents in treatment villages engaged more or less in particular types of activities at baseline
than those in control villages.
In rural Tanzania, most females engage in crop production and are, in particular, in charge of
`female' crops (e.g., food crops such as banana, beans, cassava, and maize), compared to `male'
crops (e.g., cash-yielding crops such as co®ee, cotton, tea, and tobacco) predominantly controlled
by males. As the di®ering level of sex-ratio in a village may generate the di®erence in crop choices
among villages, the share of cash-yielding crops relative to the sum of cash and food crops in
household production at baseline was also estimated in columns (e) and (f) in Appendix Table
9. The results revealed no signi¯cant di®erence between treatment and control villages. While all
these discussions may not provide a fully convincing justi¯cation for the identi¯cation assumption,
the empirical strategy explained above is the most feasible approach taken in this study, along
with the DID framework.
Another potential concern is that a widow's inheritance right to land might, in fact, be a proxy
for an improvement in women's access to other properties, which makes it di±cult to attribute an
increase in the marital probability of males in treatment villages solely to an improvement in a
widow's land right. To make a distinction between the land and other property e®ects, the analysis
also controls for a village custom regarding a widow's inheritance right to houses in both wave 5
and the base period, which appear to be another important asset in rural societies.
3.4 Sample Selection Bias
Since estimating equation (3) exploits only data pertaining to individuals who stay in their original
village (i.e., male non-migrants) in the period t+ 1 (wave 5), this selected sample can be another
source of bias. For example, if changes in the land inheritance rules force males with great (little)
appeal valued in a marriage market to move out of their original villages for some reason (which is
di±cult to identify precisely, though), this makes the estimated ®M2 biased downwards (upwards)
in equation (3). One simple way of avoiding this issue is by exploiting all panel individuals,
irrespective of whether or not they were migrants in wave 5. However, this strategy cannot be
adopted in this study because data does not include the information pertaining to speci¯c social
rule regarding a widow's land inheritance that is enforced at migrants' destination.
However, if males more or less appealing in a marriage market were indeed induced to migrate
out by the change in the rule, it is highly likely that the probability of marriage systematically
di®ers between migrants and non-migrants. As seen in subsection 4.1, however, the panel data
does not support this view, indicating that male migrants and non-migrants were identical in
terms of their marital probability. Drawn from the literature, moreover, the analysis controls for
as many determinants of migration as possible, such as age, education and household demographic
composition. Given these controls, non-migrant males may not be statistically di®erent from
migrants in a marriage equation (even though they are di®erent in another equation such as
earnings).33 Based upon these discussions, this study eventually assumes that migration-oriented
selection problem does not exist in estimating (3).
In contrast to (3), estimating equations (4) and (5) exploits female migrants as well as non-
33For example, great business acumen does not necessarily guarantee a success in a marriage market.
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migrants. Thus, the estimation results of (5) will not be negatively a®ected by selecting sample
observations, as long as the identi¯cation assumption for the male sample holds.
3.5 Other Identi¯cation Issues
Some other concerns still exist. Firstly, while this study - by exploiting the two-step approach
as well as the DID speci¯cation - attempts to control for growth-¯xed e®ects (i.e., !Mj ) in each
village, some time-varying village characteristics assumed to be unobserved (i.e., !Mjt ) might still
contaminate the estimations. Although this issue cannot be explicitly addressed in this study, this
concern will be discussed more carefully in subsection 5.2 after presenting the main estimation
results.
Another caveat for the estimations is that the estimated ®M2 may need to be interpreted as
a population-weighted average of ex-ante (expectation) and ex-post impacts of the change in the
rule of land inheritance. This point will be explained more clearly in subsection 5.3.1.
4 Data
The KHDS started in the rural region in northwest Tanzania, Kagera, as a part of a research
project on adult mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa launched by the World Bank in 1991. With
912 households drawn from the 1988 Tanzanian Census with a strati¯cation based on geography
and mortality risk,34 the ¯rst four surveys were conducted between 1991 and 1994 with a 6- or
7-month interval. After a 10-year gap from wave 4, approximately 91% of those 912 baseline
households were recontacted in 2004 (wave 5), even if located outside their original villages. When
previous members moved out of their original households, their new households were traced. This
exercise generated 2719 household surveys in wave 5, which emerged from the 832 recontacted
original households. Of the 2719 households, only half stayed in the village they resided in 10
years previously, suggesting a substantial demographic mobility in this region during one decade.
While the KHDS is a household panel survey, it enabled us to construct unbalanced panel data
from wave 1 to 5 at the individual level, as it provided the information for all household members in
all waves. The rate of sample attrition in the KHDS is very low even on an individual basis. Based
upon the careful examination of sample attrition by Beegle et al. (2011), excluding individuals
that died, approximately 82% of 5394 original respondents interviewed in the ¯rst four waves were
successfully recontacted in wave 5. This signi¯cantly high recontact rate is one of many successes
and contributions of this long-term panel survey. As throughout the waves, a standardized survey
questionnaire was used (although several changes were made in wave 5), collected information is
highly comparable across waves. In addition, the data contains a variety of information related to
a household, its members, and a village from which sample households were chosen, making the
KHDS highly valuable resource for an empirical study.
4.1 Marriage and Migration
Before providing summary statistics, the relationship between marriage and migration was overviewed
by gender. Firstly, the reason for migration is reported in Table 1, where the ¯rst two columns re-
34The sampling procedures caused households with a high risk of an adult death to be oversampled; therefore,
the ¯ndings in the subsequent analysis should be treated with caution when attempting to generalize them.
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port data pertaining to migration that took place between waves 1 and 5, and the last two columns
indicate individuals that moved into a surveyed village prior to wave 1. In accordance with the pre-
conception that women typically relocate at marriage in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, almost half
of female migration in this sample was driven by marriage. On the other hand, male migration was
hardly related to marriage. Next, Table 2 reports marital status in wave 5 of men and women that
were single in wave 1 in order to establish whether their status varies by relocation. While about
64% of females that migrated out between waves 1 and 5 were married in wave 5, the corresponding
¯gure for female non-migrants was just 19%. This discrepancy between migrants and non-migrants
con¯rms strong correlation between women's marriage and migration. On the other hand, there is
almost no di®erence in the proportion of married male migrants and non-migrants in wave 5, as in
both groups approximately 37% were married in wave 5. Thus, it appears that migration did not
a®ect male marital behavior. This di®erence in the relationship between marriage and migration
by gender is formally evaluated by estimating the linear probability of being married in wave 5
with a control of a migration dummy between waves 1 and 5 by OLS in Appendix Table 10. The
results indicate that, whilst female marital status in wave 5 positively and signi¯cantly correlates
with migration, the correlation is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero for males.
[Here, Tables 1 and 2]
4.2 Summary Statistics
To assess whether males in villages with Dj = 0 (control villages) are a suitable control group for
those in villages with Dj = 1 (treatment villages), Table 3 summarized key variables at baseline
(wave 1) with a check of the equality of the mean between these two groups. In contrast to few
individual and household attributes that di®er between the two groups, many signi¯cant di®erences
arise from village characteristics. For example, on average, a greater number of individuals lived
in treatment villages in wave 1, where public transportation was available. In addition, treatment
villages are more likely to have had a bank, a daily market, and a bar/restaurant in wave 1.
Hence, this information might characterize treatment villages as more developed and modernized,
compared to control villages. Moreover, a village formed by the villagization program in the 1970s
was found only in the treatment group. Along the famous concept of Ujamaa, an ideology of
socialism and self-reliance introduced by the ¯rst post-independent President Julius Nyerere and
the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),35 the program intended to create communally
organized socialist villages in the country where people would live and work together, mutually
respecting each other and sharing common basic goods and services (Hyden, 1980; McHenry, Jr.,
1979). Whilst this program was terminated without yielding the expected success, women living
in a village formed by this program were given an equal right to partake in some aspects of village
life (McHenry, Jr., 1979; Swantz, 1985). Thus, no control villages formed by this program might
suggest that males in treatment villages might have been more liberal with regard to women's
rights, compared to those in control villages. As, under a surge of national excitement about
women's land rights in the 1990s, these characteristics might have helped treatment villages remove
discrimination against widows regarding land inheritance during the sample periods, controlling
35TANU became Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977, a leading party in the current multi-party political
system.
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for observed village characteristics, as well as unobserved ones, is indeed crucial in the analysis
that follows.
[Here, Table 3]
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Main Results
Pooling sample villages into six districts (Biharamulo, Bukoba Rural, Bukoba Urban, Muleba,
Ngara, and Karagwe), columns (a) to (d) in Table 4 report the OLS estimation results of (3) with
the district-¯xed e®ects. While the magnitude varies depending upon which wave is exploited as
the base period, which is likely to be associated with potential measurement errors related to Dj ,36
the results support the hypothesis of this study. Using wave 1 as the base period in column (a),
for example, altering the inheritance rule pertaining to land in a village increased the probability
of males marrying in the village by 21 percentage points over 13 years.
As it is recognized that time-invariant unobserved village-level characteristics might have con-
founded these results, in order to exclude this possibility, the analysis was conducted by applying
a two-step approach following Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006). As the ¯rst step, equation (4) was
estimated for females by OLS in columns (e) to (h) in Table 4 with the district-¯xed e®ects. As
anticipated in subsection 3.3, the results indicate the non-positive impacts of altering the inheri-
tance rule on the marital probability of females with or without conventional signi¯cance. Given
these results, Table 5 pooled males and females to estimate equation (5) with an explicit control of
village-¯xed e®ects. The estimated impacts of the interaction term between Dj and gi reveal great
similarity to the corresponding impacts of Dj shown in Table 4. For example, the di®erence in the
estimated impacts of Dj between columns (a) and (e) in Table 4 is remarkably similar to the coef-
¯cient on the interaction term between Dj and gi in column (a) in Table 5, i.e., 0:209 ¡ (¡0:032)
¼ 0:267. This similarity rejects the possibility that the e®ect of improving a widow's land right
on marital probability of males identi¯ed in Table 4 captures only (time-invariant) gender-neutral
tastes and attitudes of treatment villages.
One unexpected outcome of these estimations is that having an inheritance rule related to
houses in favor of widows in wave 5 is negatively and signi¯cantly correlated with the probability
of males getting married. In fact, it is surprising that a village would apply di®erent inheritance
rules to land and houses, as houses and (banana-producing) land are usually on the same premises
in most households in this region. If the di®ering rules observed in the data are not attributed
to measurement noise, one naive explanation for this counter-intuitive ¯nding is that the negative
coe±cient may be implicitly including some unobserved, yet very strong, village-level preferences
against women's rights. Based upon conversations with the previously mentioned supervisor of the
KHDS project (wave 5), for example, allowing a widow to inherit houses, but not land, may be
an implicit way of chasing her out of her late husband's village, because she cannot earn a living
without the right to land usage. However, as the data does not facilitate exploration of di®erent
36As suggested in subsection 3.2, the number of treatment (which are reported as not having allowed a widow's
land inheritance in wave X but as having allowed it in wave 5, where X is either 1, 2, 3, or 4) and control villages
(which are reported as not having allowed a widow's land inheritance in both wave X and wave 5) used in these
estimations is di®erent across columns, with the numbers of 21 and 5 in column (a), 29 and 5 in column (b), 27 and
5 in column (c), and 29 and 2 in column (d).
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mechanisms behind this negative coe±cient further, this study eventually avoids giving a theoretical
interpretation to the coe±cient and treats this variable as a control. Excluding this variable from
regressors leaves the analytic implications almost una®ected, although it attenuates the impact
of Dj , because the inheritance rules pertaining to land and houses are positively correlated.37
Similarly, the negative e®ect of the house inheritance rule is also attenuated by excluding the land
inheritance rule from regressors. It should also be noted that the high level of correlation among
regressors generally a®ects the e±ciency of point estimates, but not the consistency.
Finally, the signi¯cantly negative association between mothers', rather than fathers', education
and the marital probability of their children is consistent with the ¯ndings reported in numerous
literature sources, whereby positive correlation between mothers' education and child welfare (ed-
ucation, earnings, etc.) is reported, as early marriage is likely to reduce educational attainment
(Field and Ambrus, 2008).
[Here, Tables 4 and 5]
5.2 Robustness: Alternative Interpretations
The preceding subsection showed that making it customary for women to inherit land following
their husband's death increased the marital probability of males living in the village. Taking into
account a traditional system of exogamous and patrilocal marriage prevalent in rural Tanzania,
this ¯nding is consistent with a view that females attempt to marry into a village that supports
the widow's right to land inheritance, because the rule can provide them with social protection in
the future. However, alternative interpretations, which may be driven by time-varying village-level
unobservable factors (!Mjt ), may also be possible for this ¯nding. This section discusses some of
those concerns.
Welfare Shocks
During the sample periods, treatment villages might have experienced economic expansion. As this
raises the value of males living in these villages in a marriage market, this economic °uctuation may
be the source of an increase in marital probability of males residing in treatment villages. In order to
assess potential di®erences in economic growth between treatment and control villages, the increase
in per capita weekly income and annual consumption was estimated by using a speci¯cation of (3)
and data pertaining to males exploited in the previous analysis (columns (a) to (h) in Appendix
Table 11). However, no signi¯cant di®erences between treatment and control villages were found
in terms of the growth of these welfare measures.
In addition, the wave 5 survey collected information pertaining to socio-economic shocks in
the past 10 years from 1994 to 2003, which had been experienced by panel respondents aged 20
years or older in wave 5. By using this information, in this study, a dummy was constructed for
positive income shocks, which takes the value of one if the respondents enjoyed high income in
any year between waves 4 and 5 due to high crop prices; bumper harvests; livestock activities;
wage employment; o®-farm employment; remittances; gifts and support by organizations; returns
37The correlation coe±cient of the inheritance rules between those related to land and houses is approximately
0.82 in the ¯rst four waves and 0.72 in wave 5. When it comes to sample observations used in the estimations in
Table 4, the correlation coe±cient between Dj and the rule of house inheritance in wave 5 is 0.72 in column (a),
0.62 in (b), 0.59 in (c), and 0.32 in (d).
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to other assets (e.g., land rental); and/or others (e.g., inheritance). Using this subjective measure
as a dependent variable also reveals no signi¯cant di®erence between treatment and control villages
in column (i) in Appendix Table 11.
Crop Choices
Whilst no signi¯cant di®erence between treatment and control villages was found in terms of the
overall welfare measures in Appendix Table 11, it may be possible that the types of agricultural
activities changed over time di®erently between treatment and control villages. As explained in
subsection 3.3, in rural Tanzania, most females are in charge of female crops. To the extent
that changes in underlying economic conditions encouraged treatment households to invest more
in those female crops than male crops, for example, the changes, rather than women's security
concerns, might have raised the marital probability of males in treatment villages by increasing
demands for female labor.
By using the same male sample and speci¯cation of (3) as before, the changes in the share
of cash-yielding crops relative to the sum of cash and food crops in household production were
estimated in Appendix Table 12. The results in all columns except column (c) suggested that
treatment villages in fact increased the share of male crops. If any factors related to the changes
in the crop choices biased the previous estimations in Table 4, it is likely that the bias worked by
providing further support for the primary ¯nding of this study.
Mortality Shocks
To the extent that treatment villages experienced a greater loss of males relative to females during
the sample periods, due to unobserved mortality shocks, than control villages did, this might have
raised the marital probability of males living in treatment villages by decreasing the male-to-female
ratio (relative to the corresponding ratio in control villages) (Becker, 1981). It is certainly possible
that the decrease in the sex-ratio associated with the mortality shocks enabled widows in treatment
villages to obtain a right of land inheritance by increasing women's bargaining power in a village,
as females had to control land due to a greater number of male deaths.
Kagera has historically been one of the regions most seriously a®ected by HIV/AIDS in Tan-
zania. In addition, as seen in subsection 4.2, the panel data suggests that treatment villages were
more developed and modernized at baseline than control villages were. Since mortality shocks asso-
ciated with HIV/AIDS may be more serious in urban areas, the increase in the marital probability
of males in treatment villages may be attributed to shifts in the gender composition of population
driven by health-related shocks.
In order to explore this possibility, Appendix Table 13 reports the estimation results of (3)
by using the same male sample as before, after replacing the dependent variable with variables
assumed to capture mortality shocks experienced by those males. Using the growth of per capita
annual household expenditures related to household members' illness and death as the dependent
variable in columns (a) to (d), this study ¯nds no evidence supporting the view that males in
treatment villages spent more on health and funeral services because they were more seriously
a®ected by mortality shocks.38 However, one potential concern remains in the signi¯cantly negative
38Taking the log of the health-related expenditures might generate sample selection bias. However, if males
in treatment villages spend more on health-related goods or services, the e®ect of Dj on the growth of those
health-related expenditures will be overestimated by taking the log. Even in the presence of this potential sample
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association betweenDj and the growth of health-related expenditures in column (d), which suggests
that mortality shocks were more serious in control villages, compared to treatment villages. If the
greater shocks experienced by control villages a®ected females more than males, the previously
identi¯ed positive e®ect of Dj on the marital probability of males in Table 4 might have been
overestimated by increasing the sex-ratio in control villages (relative to the corresponding ratio
in treatment villages). However, this concern is absent in all the other columns. Moreover, if
the greater shocks experienced by control villages were more serious for males than for females,
the bias would show the opposite direction, suggesting that the true impact of Dj on the marital
probability of males is more positive.
Alternatively, based upon the information on the past socio-economic shocks explained in the
above `welfare shocks' section, another dependent variable - a dummy for health shocks, equal to
one if respondents aged 20 years or above in wave 5 experienced income or asset losses in any
year between 1994 and 2003 due to household members' death or serious illness - was used in the
estimation in column (e). Despite exploiting this alternative subjective measure, no signi¯cant
di®erence was found between treatment and control villages.
Village Infrastructure
In addition to exploring the growth in income and consumption, the analysis also compared im-
provements in village infrastructure between treatment and control villages over time, as potential
factors re°ecting economic expansion in each village. By constructing panel data at the village
level, the analysis investigated changes in village infrastructure in terms of a bank, a daily market,
public transportation, and a bar or a restaurant in Appendix Table 14. All the results show that
treatment villages experienced less improvement in terms of availability of those facilities, which
may be associated with higher levels of economic development in treatment villages at baseline. In
Table 4, all these village characteristics at baseline were explicitly controlled for. Thus, if economic
growth measured by the improvement of the village infrastructure raises the marital probability of
males by increasing their value in a marriage market, it might have generated bias in the estima-
tions in Table 4 by attenuating the positive impacts of Dj . Again, this provides further support
for the ¯nding of this study.
5.3 Heterogeneity
5.3.1 Ex-ante and Ex-post E®ects
As already touched upon in subsection 3.5, it appears that the estimated ®M2 is a population-
weighted average of ex-ante (expectation) and ex-post impacts of altering the land inheritance
rules.
This remark arises from three pieces of background information; in this study, ¯rstly, an im-
provement in a widow's land right is measured by changes in the customary rule in each village
rather than a nationally authorized lawful action at a particular point in time. Since the customary
rule is likely to change gradually over time, as well as spread through a community by degrees
rather than suddenly or all at once, it is quite likely that people adjust their marital behavior,
expecting the rule of land inheritance to be revised in the near future under a surge of national
selection bias, the estimations in Appendix Table 13 reveal no evidence in support of the view that treatment villages
experienced more serious mortality shocks than control villages did.
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excitement about women's land rights in the 1990s. This suggests that the previously estimated
®M2 might have implicitly included some expectation e®ects of removing discrimination against
widows. This possibility will be tested below shortly. Secondly, according to interviews with vil-
lage leaders, data reveals little improvement in a widow's inheritance right in the ¯rst four waves,
suggesting that most villages removed discrimination against widows between waves 4 and 5. In
fact, this is compatible with women's land rights movement, which emerged in the 1990s and con-
tributed to the enactment of the Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999. However, for
villages that changed the social rule regarding a widow's land inheritance after wave 4, the exact
timing of the change cannot be discerned from the available data. Thirdly, timing of marriage is
seemingly distributed between 1991 and 2004 with an adequate variation in data. Regarding the
distribution, Figure 2 presents empirical cumulative distribution functions of baseline age for males
aged below 18 years in wave 1 by their marital status in wave 5. Clearly, the distribution of those
who married by wave 5 ¯rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of those who remained
single until wave 5. As this pattern of distribution suggests that single male children in wave 1
systematically self-selected into marital relationship as they reached some cut-o® point of age for
marriage, consequently, some proportion of males in the sample must have married in advance of
changes in the land inheritance rules.
In order to examine, albeit simplistically, the manner in which this background information
contributed to the above remark, let's assume that villages that changed the social rule (treatment
villages) can be grouped into two types - those that changed the rule at the end of the sample
periods (group A) and those that did so at the beginning of the sample periods (group B). Then,
the linear probability of getting married between the periods t and t+ 1 can be modeled as
Mijt+1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
°1 + ²ijt+1 for those who are in the group A (treatment villages)
°2 + ²ijt+1 for those who are in the group B (treatment villages)
²ijt+1 for those who are in control villages
(6)
where °1 and °2 are the ex-ante (expectation) and ex-post impacts of the change in the social rule,
respectively. With a dummy for the group A, Aj , pooling all villages yields
Mijt+1 = °2Dj + (°1 ¡ °2)DjAj + ²ijt+1: (7)
This is a simpli¯ed version of equation (3) with an exception of the interaction term between
Dj and Aj . When the timing of the change in the social rule cannot be ascertained from the
available data for either treatment group, the interaction term cannot be included in regressors.
Then, a standard OLS argument shows that with additional assumptions of E(Dj²ijt+1) = 0 and
E(Dj jAj) = E(Dj) 8 i, j, and t, regressing Mijt+1 only on Dj results in39
plimn!1 °^2 = p°1 + (1¡ p)°2: (8)
39Equation (8) can be derived as
plimn!1 °^2 = °2 +
(°1 ¡ °2)E(D2jAj)
E(D2j )
= °2 + (°1 ¡ °2)p:
where E(D2jAj) = Prob(Aj = 1) ¢ E(Dj jAj = 1) = Prob(Aj = 1) ¢ E(Dj) (by assumptions) and E(D2j ) = E(Dj)
are used from the ¯rst to the second line.
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where p ´ Prob(Aj = 1) is the probability of males being in the group A. Equation (8) suggests
that, unless DjAj is explicitly included in the empirical model, the estimated e®ect of the change
in the inheritance rule will converge to p°1 + (1¡ p)°2 as the sample size (n) grows, which can be
interpreted as a population weighted average of ex-ante and ex-post e®ects of Dj . Note that this
is true in the absence of any correlation between Dj and ²ijt+1 in equation (7).
Another implication from equation (8) is that the estimated ®M2 in (3) might be biased down-
wards, provided that the expectation e®ect is absent (i.e., °1 = 0). One way of testing for the
presence of the expectation e®ect is to split sample males into two groups - the young (aged 5 to
12 years) and the old (aged 13 to 18 years), in wave 1.40 As shown in Figure 2, it appears that
single male children in wave 1 systematically entered into marital relationship as they aged, which,
in turn, suggests that, on average, the old group are more likely to have married earlier than the
young group did during the sample periods. While the data does not reveal exactly when most
villages altered the land inheritance rule between the waves 4 and 5, the distribution pattern in
Figure 2 may indicate that some expectation e®ect exists, provided that the change in the rule
a®ected the marital probability of the old group as well as that of the young group.
After splitting the male sample into the two groups, equation (3) was estimated in Table 6. As
shown in Table 4, the magnitude of the impacts is di®erent across columns, depending upon which
wave is used as the base period. However, the results reveal quite a robust picture supporting the
view that the expectation e®ect does exist.
Somewhat surprisingly, the ex-ante e®ect is greater than the ex-post e®ect, suggesting that the
advantage in treatment villages with respect to the marital probability of males dies out over time.
Likely, males in control villages may try to attract single females by o®ering additional resources
(e.g., bride prices) to those females, or credibly promising to allocate more of (divisible) marital
outputs to potential spouses in a marriage market (transferable utility model). Similarly, if such
resource transfer is not feasible (non-transferable utility model), those males in control villages
may attempt to invest in themselves in order to be perceived as more attractive in a marriage
market (Peters and Siow, 2002). As both these adjustments may eventually eliminate di®erences
in the marital probability of males between treatment and control villages, this adjustment process
may be seen as one potential interpretation for the ¯nding.
Alternatively, control villages might also have removed discrimination against widows after
wave 5. In fact, all villages in an economy seem to have eventually removed the discrimination.
If this is indeed the case, single females might have attempted to marry into control villages for
the latter half of sample periods, expecting future changes in the inheritance rule, which might
have taken place after wave 5. This may also be another interpretation for the smaller di®erence
in marital probability of the young cohort between treatment and control villages than that of the
old cohort.
Another interpretation for the estimation results is that the old cohort in treatment villages
enjoyed the greater advantage regarding the marital probability because they had access to the
marriage market for longer than the younger cohort did. This may be true, provided that most
40Another possible test is to change the base period of (3) from wave 1 to wave X (where X is either 2, 3 or 4) after
excluding individuals that married between wave 1 and X. Given that most villages altered the land inheritance
rule after wave 4, excluding married males is likely to remove from the sample those who got married in advance of
the inheritance rule changing. If there is no expectation e®ect (i.e., °1 = 0), thus, sliding the base period towards
wave 5, as well as excluding those who got married by wave 4 - implying a decrease in p in (8) - is likely to increase
the estimated impact of ®M2 in (3). However, this test could not be conducted within the present study, as only a
few males aged 5 to 18 years in wave 5 got married between waves 1 and 4.
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villages changed the land inheritance rule immediately after wave 4 (hence, the treatment e®ect is
largely the ex-post e®ect for both groups) and that the positive gain arising from the treatment
did not appear at the point of an individual's entry into the marriage market, but rather gradually
materialized over time.41 Or more simply, most of the young cohort might still have been too
young to get married in wave 5, despite the fact that the village removed discrimination against
widows regarding land inheritance. Unfortunately, the data does not enable further tests that
would distinguish these possibilities; nonetheless, the di®erence in the treatment e®ect between
the young and old cohorts suggests the presence of some mechanism along these dimensions (or a
di®erent, yet unidenti¯ed, scenario).
[Here, Figure 2 and Table 6]
5.3.2 Land Size
Finally, this subsection explores how the e®ect of introducing a new inheritance rule in favor of
widowed women varies by the size of an individual's farmland within a village. Assuming that
women's relocation associated with marriage is driven by an attractive land inheritance rule at the
destination, they are more likely to marry males, not only living in a village characterized by a
favorable inheritance rule, but also having a large size of farmland.
To test this story, the following model was estimated for males used in the previous analysis,
Mijt+1 = ¼M1 + ¼
M
2 Dj ¢ Lijt + ¼M 03 xit + !Mj + ²ijt+1; (9)
where Lijt is the size (acre) of land area cultivated by a household which a male i in a village j
belonged to in wave t, assuming that the predetermined land size has exogenous variation in the
marriage equation. In contrast to estimating (3), note that this speci¯cation does not include xjt,
but instead allows for controlling for village-¯xed e®ects explicitly. Consequently, ¼M2 , which is
expected to be positive, can be identi¯ed by using variation in marital probability across households
within treatment villages.
The estimation results of (9) are reported in columns (b), (d), (f), and (h) in Table 7. In the
other columns, a vector xjt was included with a dummy of Dj after replacing the village-¯xed
e®ects with district-¯xed e®ects. The evidence is less conclusive, as only using wave 4 as the
base period in columns (g) and (h) provides some evidence supporting the heterogeneity in the
treatment e®ect, associated with the size of farmland. Based upon interviews conducted by the
author in Karagwe district, seemingly, once they reach marriageable age, males inherit land from
their father or purchase it and start to build their own house (typically in their natal village).
Consequently, using the size of farmland at the level of an original household may not be a good
proxy for the size of farmland actually owned by an individual male.42 In addition, as the land
size is estimated by respondents in the KHDS, possible measurement errors may also account for
this weak evidence.
[Here, Table 7]
41I wish to thank Kazunari Tsukada for this insightful observation.
42Even using (log of) a household's cultivated land area per capita did not provide strong support for this
heterogeneity.
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6 Conclusion
To provide rigorous empirical support for the view that good marriage plays an important in-
stitutional role as women's old age insurance in the developing world, this study explored the
relationship between a customary rule regarding a widow's land inheritance and the pattern of
women's relocation associated with marriage in rural Tanzania. The hypothesis that the marital
probability of males is higher in a village that allows a widow's land inheritance than in a village
that does not was tested, assuming that females attempt to marry into the progressive village for
old age protection and that the resultant competition among those females might reduce the cost
of marriage incurred by males living in that village (e.g., search cost, bride prices, etc.).
This research used a unique, natural experimental setting, based on the data drawn from rural
Tanzania for the period of 1991-2004. During this period, several villages that initially banned
widows from inheriting land eliminated this discrimination. Comparing males living in such a
village with their counterparts residing in a village that discriminated against widows throughout
the sample periods enabled interpretation of the di®erence in their marital probability as a causal
e®ect of empowering widows on women's relocation motivated by marriage. Controlling for the
endogeneity associated with changes in the customary rule was the hardest empirical task, because
the changes appeared not randomly assigned across villages. With an explicit control of village-
¯xed e®ects, together with a full set of village-level characteristics, the DID approach provided
evidence in support of the hypothesis that making it possible for widows to inherit land in a village
increased the marital probability of males living in the village.
In rural societies in developing countries, women not only work very hard, but also reproduce
the labor of next generation as mothers. Therefore, their relocation associated with marriage
has considerable welfare consequences. As the current study demonstrated that women's old age
concern signi¯cantly a®ected their spatial mobility, reducing the cost of social security in the future
(e.g., by establishing social pension programs) will have remarkable in°uence on the long-term
spatial distribution of population and welfare. In addition to this fundamental lesson, the ¯ndings
reported here also highlight the e®ectiveness of exploiting an appropriate economic incentive as a
policy tool for empowering women, as the current study revealed their rational response to changes
in (expected) economic returns in their old life. However, having an in-depth understanding of
local institutions (e.g., clan exogamy and patrilocality, in the context of the current study) would
be prerequisite for taking this approach. Without this knowledge, a newly introduced incentive
system may unexpectedly alter the pattern of economic development. Moreover, this research
con¯rmed a traditional view of a marriage market in rural Africa operating across neighboring
villages, suggesting that any policy interventions for challenging traditional marital practices, such
as early marriage and polygamy, should be spatially extensive, although further research is needed
for providing more precise prescriptions about the geographical scope.
A few reservations may be expressed with respect to the ¯ndings of this study. First, some time-
varying shocks experienced by treatment villages during the sample periods might have adversely
a®ected the reported estimations. Thus, attempts were made to assess whether and how those
potential shocks confounded the estimations from several perspectives (e.g., welfare, mortality).
Regarding the perspectives examined in this paper, the several attempts served to strengthen,
rather than weaken, the signi¯cance of the results, suggesting that the estimates reported by this
study may provide the most conservative indications of the relationship between a customary rule
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governing a widow's land inheritance and the marital probability of males. However, it may still
be doubtful that the empirical results are entirely free from endogeneity bias, making alternative
interpretations of the reported results possible. This concern may also arise from likely noise in
measuring a widow's land inheritance, counter-intuitive impacts of the house inheritance rule, and
relatively weak evidence in support of the heterogeneity in the treatment e®ect associated with
the farmland size. Consequently, the ¯ndings of this study will have to be interpreted with these
quali¯cations in mind. Nevertheless, this study adds one piece of evidence, shedding light on the
signi¯cance of an old age issue that might have been long out of the headlines of international
policy debates focusing on the development. Combining this evidence with qualitative information
additionally collected by the author in the surveyed area, overall, it may be surmised that women
strategically chose their husband to protect their quality of life in the future. Further empirical
work could greatly enhance our understanding of the institutional role of marriage as means of
women's old age insurance, or more generally, social insurance.
Finally, an empirical framework exploited in this paper may be used for analyzing the impacts
of removing discrimination against widows on parents' incentive to invest in agricultural innovation
and/or in children, as partly done in previous studies.43 These questions are also open for future
research.
43For example, a village having a customary rule that allows widows to inherit land may increase the level of
girls' education relative to boys' education in the village, provided that it reduces mothers' preference for sons by
providing mothers with alternative safety nets.
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A Appendix: More on Institutional Background
A.1 Historical Perspective of Land Tenure Policy
In the pre-colonial period, land was a communally owned property in Tanzania and it was vested
in a family or a group of extended families, known as clan. A headman of family or a chief of clan
administrated land matters on behalf of the entire family or the clan members, and any borrowing
in excess of the amount of land allocated to each family or clan had to be authorized by the
community.
At the end of the 19th century, the Germans ¯rst colonized Tanzania and the Government
con¯scated large areas of land from indigenous people to give to European settlers. Based on
the imperial decree passed by the German Government in 1895, land owned by an indigenous
community was regarded as `unowned land' and its free expropriation was permitted. As the
concept of individualized ownership was also introduced during this time, transactions involving
land became possible, albeit subject to documentary evidence as a proof of title, which many
Africans lacked in a land tenure system of the pre-colonial period.
After Tanganyika moved to Britain (1922-1961) under the supervision of the League of Na-
tions, the British Government had to ful¯ll their obligation under the Trusteeship Agreements,
which provided as follows, \In framing laws relating to the holding or transfer of land and natural
resources, the Administering Authority shall take into consideration native laws and customs, and
shall respect the rights and safeguard the interests, both present and future, of the native popu-
lation. No native land or natural resources may be transferred except between natives, save with
the previous consent of the competent public authority. No real rights over native land or natural
resources in favour of non-natives may be created except with the same consent." In response to
this Article 8, the British Government declared all land to be `public land' in the Land Tenure
Ordinance instituted in 1923 and statutorily recognized `title of native community lawfully using
or occupying land in accordance with customary law.' In reality, however, an exploitative structure
by the colonial government remained. Since the British Government's priority was given to the
interests of foreign settlers and planters, for example, this `customary right of occupancy' was often
ignored. In addition, in 1953, customary law was invalidated in all urban areas declared a town-
ship, municipality or minor settlement (Circular no. 4). Moreover, following the introduction of
the Land Tenure Ordinance, the issue of documentary title was still necessary in land transactions.
Following the declaration of independence in 1961, colonial land tenure policies were more
or less absorbed by the newly emergent state. In contemporary Tanzania, therefore, since the
independence, all land has been public, although all rights of land ownership, i.e. `radical title',
have been vested in the President in trust for the whole nation, thus still leaving possibilities
for the executive to freely allocate land to government agencies or private foreign investors for
the public purpose. There is essentially no freehold form of land tenure and land holders possess
only leaseholds of a speci¯ed duration. Consequently, land matters of the people, such as those
pertaining to acquisition, use, disposal and bequeathing, are taken in the sense of the `right of
occupancy'. Moreover, potential disputes related to land are ¯rstly dealt with at a village council,
which has substantial power at the local level, before being presented to the primary court (and
¯nally the district or high court, in case of an appeal).
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A.2 Pluralistic Legal System about Inheritance
As described in Section 2.2, in Tanzania, the inheritance of estates is primarily governed by three
di®erent laws - Customary, Islamic, and Statutory laws - that provide for both testate and in-
testate succession. Moreover, each of these legal systems is connected by ethnicity and religious
a±nity. In Tanzania, there are approximately 120 ethnic groups (Killian, 2011, p.8) that, albeit
distinguished by socio-cultural factors, show commonality in their belief systems, associated with
African traditional religion. In contemporary Tanzania, this traditional religion is no longer in a
populational rivalry with two major religions of Christianity and Islam, as 60% of population is
Christian, 36% Muslim, and 2% are followers of African traditional religion (Pew Forum, 2010,
p.20).44 Nevertheless, it is quite common that those who identify themselves as Christians and
Muslims customarily practice the traditional religion, further complicating inheritance matters.
It can be problematic to determine which inheritance law - Customary Law, arguably associated
with the traditional religion (Killian, 2011, pp.38-40), or Islamic Law, founded on Qur'an - applies
when an African is a Muslim. This is an important issue, as there is a con°ict between these two
laws. For those who die testate, presumably, their intention would be appreciated. If their will is
challenged by any of the intended or would-be bene¯ciaries, or in the case of intestate succession,
either Customary or Islamic Law applies, depending upon which one dominated the life of the
deceased (a mode of life test). In contrast to Islamic Law, Statutory Law, i.e., law enacted by
Parliament of either the colonial or post independent state, applies to Christians, but only when
Customary Law does not apply to them. Despite Islamic and Statutory laws adopted in particular
situations, in practice, these two laws are superseded by Customary Law, which applies to the
majority of Africans living in rural areas.
A.3 Women's Mobility during a Post-independence Single-party Period
The ¯rst women's organized mobilization can be found in women's section of TANU, which was
formed as a nationwide nationalist party in 1954. In 1965, this section developed into a na-
tional women's organization called Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (UWT) under a post-
independence single-party system. Throughout the single-party period, the UWT played the role
of a women's wing of the ruling party, in charge of improving women's social status (Tenga and
Peter, 1996). The Employment Ordinance was, for example, amended in 1975 due to the UWT's
e®orts, so that a female o±cer certi¯ed as pregnant could be entitled to paid maternity leave of 84
days every three years, which might be taken once at any time between the commencement of the
seventh month of pregnancy and the day following the termination of pregnancy by a live delivery.
In addition, the UWT contributed to clearly providing for grounds for divorce in the LMA. De-
spite its achievements, however, the UWT primarily served as one of party-a±liated organizations
aimed at disseminating the TANU's ideology, rather than an independent and legitimate political
forum for and by women. In addition, the single-party system greatly restricted women's freedom
of association and expression by prohibiting women from organizing and mobilizing independently.
Consequently, the limited women's mobilization did not achieve a substantial improvement in their
land rights during the single-party period, making them still highly vulnerable to land insecurity.
44While religious composition is somewhat controversial, Christians and Muslims constitute the majority of pop-
ulation in contemporary Tanzania. In the current data set, approximately 12% of a household heads declared
themselves as Muslim in wave 1, with 82% reporting some type of Christianity as their religion, and 3% following
African traditional religion.
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A.4 Villagization Program in the 1970s
Along the lines of the well-known concept of Ujamaa (`familyhood' or `brotherhood' in Swahili),
an ideology of socialism and self-reliance introduced by the ¯rst post-independent President Julius
Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),45 the villagization program intended
to create communally organized socialist villages (ujamaa villages) in the country, where people
would live and work together, mutually respecting each other and sharing common basic goods
and services.
When the government formally started this program with the Arusha Declaration of 1967,
most rural population lived at widely scattered locations throughout the countryside. This policy
was, therefore, associated with initially voluntary (1967-1972) and later compulsive (1973 onwards)
resettlement of people into clustered villages. By the end of the 1970s, about 75% of the rural
population relocated to clustered villages (McHenry, 1979, p.150),46 although not all clustered
villages were recognized as an ujamaa village. At the beginning of this program, some confusion
existed about the nature of an ujamaa village, because neither the concept of `living together' nor
`working together' was clearly de¯ned. To avoid this confusion, the Villages and Ujamaa Villages
Act (hereinafter, Villagization Act) was established in 1975, which provided for registration of
villages, administration of registered villages, and designation of ujamaa villages.4748
The process of moving people to clustered villages brie°y experienced three stages: persuasion
(1967-69), inducement (1969-72), and compulsion (1973-76).49 In reality, considerable resettlement
took place in the last stage, where the policy implementation was primarily left to each region
(operation villagization). While operational procedures di®ered from region to region, militia,
policemen, and junior o±cials typically went to an assigned area and forced the movement of
population. To expedite the process, houses were sometimes burned, roofs ripped o®, and doors
and windows removed, and personal belongings were damaged when loaded into trucks that were
used to transport people and goods to new villages.
Great regional variations also existed in the government's e®ort of operation. For example, an
attempt to enforce resettlement was somewhat avoided in wealthy regions where private farming
was well established, such as Kilimanjaro and West Lake (Hyden, 1975, p.56). In addition, areas
occupied by a low proportion of government o±cials underwent forced resettlement earlier than did
those having a higher proportion (McHenry, Jr., 1979, p.134). Even in each region, some criteria
for setting up new villages existed, such as access to roads, water and presence of social amenities.
45TANU became Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977, a leading party in a current multi-party political system.
46According to the research conducted by the Dar-es-Salaam Institute of Land Administration and Policy Studies
(DILAPS), by 1979, approximately 15 million individuals, some forcibly and without any compensation, relocated
to 8,300 ujamaa villages (Lugoe, 2008, p.5).
47In the Villagization Act, villages were categorized either as ordinary villages or ujamaa villages. Broadly
speaking, a village could apply to become an ujamaa village once it undertook a substantial portion of economic
activities on a communal basis, as well as achieved a certain number of families. By this Act, the multipurpose
cooperative, which had been previously considered as the highest form of an ujamaa village, became a precondition
to designation as a village, and communal production was identi¯ed as the distinguishing feature of an ujamaa
village (McHenry, 1979, p.102).
48Just prior to the establishment of the Villagization Act, rural population was brought to live in planned villages
(or development villages), i.e., reorganized traditional villages or newly established villages, where people relocated
from surrounding areas (Swantz, 1985). This community could become an ujamaa village once it succeeded in the
transition to communal production (Moore, 1979, p.68).
49In the stage of persuasion, a great variety of agents, such as ministers, regional commissioners, and TANU
o±cials, toured rural areas, passing a message of Ujamaa and exhorting people to move into clustered villages. In
the second stage of inducement, the government o®ered material incentives, such as the provision of water, land,
productive equipment, and non-material incentives, including the association of the status of a person, position, or
institution with an ujamaa village.
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Before the introduction of the villagization program, clustered villages were seen as a way to im-
prove agricultural productivity and facilitate the delivery of services, such as schooling, healthcare,
and water supply. However, this was not always the case. The villagization, for example, initially
brought about a disruption in agricultural work and also jeopardized the agricultural production
of those who had to relocate to a place distant from their ¯elds. In addition, the promised services
were lacking in some places due to the government's limited budget. Moreover, the large-scale
resettlement made people uncertain of their future claim to land ownership, as others now settled
on land having belonged to them prior to the program. After the failure of the ujamaa social-
ism policy in the 1980s, some people moved back to their original residences, which sometimes
culminated in con°icts about land ownership between original and new settlers.
Whilst the villagization program came to an end without an expected success, women's social
position might have been improved in a village formed by this program. In a clustered village,
every ordinary resident aged 18 or above was eligible for membership in all the powerful village
assemblies, irrespective of gender and marital status. In addition, both males and females were
entitled to work on a communally owned farm and receive remuneration according to their labor
inputs. The extent to which women could take advantage of these opportunities in those days is
arguable.50 However, giving women an equal right to partake in some aspects of village life in
these ways seems to have raised a public awareness against gender-based discrimination in a social
life.
In fact, existing ethnographic studies provide suggestive evidence that the work pattern re-
markably di®ered in clustered villages, where women were more empowered compared to their
counterparts residing in traditional villages. In Kangabusharo ujamaa village, for example, com-
munal work was performed three mornings a week in addition to an individual's work on own
plots, and both males and females were involved in communal activities, such as tea production
and management of carpentry cooperative (Swantz, 1985, pp.62-63). In addition, Kilimelile uja-
maa village in Bukoba District called public attention by selecting a woman as a chairperson for
the ¯rst time (ibid, pp.65-66). Moreover, in some ujamaa villages, Haya women, a dominant tribe
in Kagera, were accepted as heads of household and as holders of the tenure to the plots of land
they had purchased themselves. This has changed a previous image of women as dependents of
male family members (ibid, pp.60-61).
B Appendix: Descriptions of Welfare Variables
Per Capita Annual Consumption
Per capita annual consumption is the average of a household's total annual consumption. The pro-
cessed household-level consumption is publicly available and composed of food consumption (sea-
sonal and non-seasonal) and non-food consumption (education and health expenditures, miscella-
neous non-food expenditures, etc.). SeeKagera Health and Development Survey ¡ Consumption
Expenditure Data for details at http://www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.
htm.
50As the Villagization Act did not provide for a legal framework for land tenure arrangements, land was usually
allocated to newly created villages for collective farming. Subsequently, the village council granted plots of land to
village members for their farming at the household level. As the council was largely dominated by male members,
who basically followed customary practices governing land administration, women were still in a disadvantaged
position in terms of their right to accessing and owning land during this program (Killian, 2011, p.18).
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Per Worker Weekly Income
Total per worker weekly income is calculated on an individual basis as the sum of wage earnings,
non-farm self-employment income, and farming self-employment income. The KHDS collected an
individual's wage earnings in the past 7 days. This includes salary after deduction of all taxes,
per diem allowances, bonuses, incentives, gratuities, overtime income, payment in kind, and so
forth. The non-farm self-employment income is the sum of net pro¯ts from all non-farm household
businesses. This is calculated by adding the value of products consumed or used by households
for their use to net cash revenues from those businesses. Since income reference periods for the
non-farm self-employed activities were the past 2 weeks, this paper simply took the time average to
compute the weekly income. To construct an individual's income measure, the household income
was ¯nally allocated to each household member in proportion to an individual's hours worked
on those activities in the past 7 days, which were individually reported in a di®erent section from
sections collecting household-level self-employment income. The farming self-employment income is
the household-level annual (or 6-month in waves 2 to 4) net pro¯ts from self-employed farming and
livestock activities. This is calculated by adding the value of crops and crop- or livestock-related
home products consumed or used by households or lost for some reasons (e.g., natural disasters,
thefts) to net cash revenues from those activities. As in the case of non-farm self-employment
income, the weekly income is the time average of annual (or 6-month) income and the household-
level weekly income was assigned to each household member in proportion to an individual's hours
worked on those activities in the past 7 days.
Per Capita Weekly Income
Per capita weekly income is the average of the total weekly income of a household. The household
income consists of the income from the activities described before: wage employment, non-farm
self-employment, and farming self-employment.
Price Index
All monetary values in this paper are transformed into baseline prices (1991 prices) by using
the Laspeyres and Fisher indices, both of which are in the public domain and constructed by
household-wave group. See Kagera Health and Development Survey ¡ Price index for details
at http://www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm.
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Table 1: Reason for Migration
Move out Move in
from wave 1 to 5 by wave 1
Male Female Male Female
(1) Economic reason
No job / wanted better job 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01
Business Opportunities 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.00
Land not available 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.05
(2) Schooling 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02
(3) Family related reason
Marriage 0.03 0.47 0.00 0.44
Divorce 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06
Widowhood 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02
Death of parents 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.06
Illness of household members 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other family problems 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.11
(4) Political reason
Posted to new area 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03
Political / economic problems 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.00
(5) Other 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.14
No. of migrants 626 955 995 1521
Notes: (1) Migrants in the ¯rst two columns are those who migrated out their original village at some point between
1991 and 2004, whereas migrants in the latter two columns are those interviewed in wave 1 who migrated into their
surveyed village prior to wave 1. (2) The number is the proportion relative to the total number of migrants in each
category.
Table 2: Marriage and Migration by Migration Status
Migrants Non-
migrants
Total Internal External
(A) Males
Married in wave 5 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.37
No. of individuals 444 317 127 962
(B) Females
Married in wave 5 0.64 0.67 0.51 0.19
No. of individuals 685 552 133 758
Notes: (1) Individuals are respondents who were interviewed in both waves 1 and 5 and single in wave 1. (2)
Migrants can be split into those who moved out of original villages but remained within Kagera (internal) and those
who left the region (external). (3) The number is the proportion relative to the total number of individuals in each
gender-migration-status category.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Male (5-18) non-migrants in wave 1
Treatment group Control group
(No. of villages = 21) (No. of villages = 5)
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs.
(1) Individual characteristics in wave 1
Age 10.80 [3.92] 223 11.55 [4.23] 58
Education (years) 1.90 [2.50] 223 2.15 [2.61] 58
Height (cm) 130.98 [18.96] 215 135.65 [22.58] 55
Weight (kg) 28.90 [10.93] 215 31.76 [13.83] 55
Parents' education (years)
Father 5.32 [3.10] 223 5.60 [2.65] 58
Mother 4.88 [2.63] 223 4.74 [2.80] 58
Parents died prior to a respondent being age 15 (one if yes)
Father 0.34 [0.47] 223 0.41 [0.49] 58
Mother 0.24 [0.42] 223 0.24 [0.43] 58
(2) Household characteristics in wave 1
Head's age 50.29 [14.83] 223 47.18 [18.64] 58
Head's tribe = Largest ethnic group (one if yes)
0.84*** [0.36] 223 0.98 [0.13] 58
HH head born outside a village (one if yes)
0.44** [0.49] 223 0.27 [0.45] 58
HH head is Muslim (one if yes)
0.10*** [0.30] 223 0.01 [0.13] 58
No. of HH members aged 3 to 15
Total 3.81 [1.65] 223 3.81 [1.83] 58
Male 2.25 [1.08] 223 2.43 [1.31] 58
Female 1.56 [1.29] 223 1.37 [1.28] 58
HH size 7.28 [2.65] 223 7.86 [2.81] 58
HH's cultivated land (acre)
4.30*** [4.52] 221 2.99 [2.47] 57
(3) Village characteristics in wave 1
Population 2561.99*** [1589.57] 223 2014.05 [503.16] 58
A dummy for a village
formed by the 0.24*** [0.42] 223 0.00 [ - ] 58
villagization
having a bank 0.08*** [0.27] 223 0.00 [ - ] 58
having a daily market 0.45*** [0.49] 223 0.24 [0.43] 58
having a public 0.34*** [0.47] 223 0.00 [ - ] 58
transportation passed
a bar or restaurant 0.53*** [0.49] 223 0.25 [0.44] 58
Note: The equality of means between treatment and control villages are examined by T-tests. *** denotes signi¯-
cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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Table 4: Impacts of Inheritance Right to Land by Gender
Dependent variable: One if get married between waves X and 5
Sample: Non-migrant males (5-18) only All females (3-15)
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4 X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Remove discrimination regarding 0.209** 0.221*** 0.290*** 0.343*** -0.032 -0.193*** -0.137** -0.072
a widow's land inheritance [0.084] [0.074] [0.046] [0.066] [0.093] [0.050] [0.059] [0.049]
between waves X and 5
Age (years) in wave X 0.122** 0.071* 0.015 0.120** 0.142*** 0.164*** 0.101** 0.169***
[0.045] [0.039] [0.032] [0.045] [0.031] [0.036] [0.046] [0.045]
Age squared in wave X -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.004** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.005**
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Education (years) in wave X 0.004 0.014 0.022 0.029 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.039*
[0.023] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
Height (cm) in wave X -0.002 0.003 0.013*** -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.009* 0.002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Weight (kg) in wave X 0.013 0.008 -0.007 0.012** 0.002 -0.006 -0.004 0.007
[0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
Father's education (years) -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.012
[0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]
Mother's education (years) -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.048*** -0.023** -0.028** -0.022* -0.035***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.010]
Father died before a 0.077 0.045 0.012 -0.018 -0.060 -0.095* -0.119* -0.059
respondent being aged 15 [0.057] [0.040] [0.041] [0.055] [0.073] [0.048] [0.058] [0.053]
Mother died before a 0.005 0.007 0.020 -0.131 0.087* -0.024 0.034 0.034
respondent being aged 15 [0.064] [0.070] [0.064] [0.103] [0.047] [0.052] [0.052] [0.061]
Head's tribe = Largest 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.108 -0.139 -0.040 -0.083 -0.081
ethnic group in a [0.138] [0.085] [0.081] [0.094] [0.130] [0.081] [0.084] [0.105]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside -0.037 0.000 -0.457*** 0.360*** 0.009 -0.431*** -0.395** -0.150
a village in wave X [0.057] [0.000] [0.116] [0.092] [0.051] [0.092] [0.147] [0.103]
Head's age in wave X -0.000 -0.002 -0.003** 0.000 -0.000 0.003* 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Head Muslim in wave X 0.005 -0.056 -0.051 -0.267*** 0.013 -0.007 -0.047 0.008
[0.069] [0.047] [0.048] [0.087] [0.081] [0.060] [0.088] [0.080]
No. of HH male members 0.049 0.022 0.079*** 0.103*** 0.042* 0.028 0.025 0.024
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.037] [0.021] [0.023] [0.027] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.023]
No. of HH female members 0.016 -0.005 0.011 0.063** 0.032 0.017 0.014 -0.011
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.025] [0.024] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025] [0.024] [0.026] [0.025]
HH size in wave X -0.027* -0.004 -0.015 -0.046*** -0.031** -0.015* -0.016 -0.005
[0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.015] [0.011] [0.008] [0.012] [0.010]
Log of cultivated 0.035 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.035 -0.031 0.012 -0.020
land (acre) in wave X [0.040] [0.029] [0.035] [0.030] [0.026] [0.028] [0.030] [0.028]
Log of population in -0.059 -0.121* -0.102** -0.102 0.000 -0.005 -0.046 0.035
a village in wave X [0.046] [0.061] [0.049] [0.083] [0.077] [0.046] [0.049] [0.096]
Village formed by -0.125** 0.023 0.070* 0.090 0.018 0.040 -0.004 0.059
the villagization in the 1970's [0.051] [0.063] [0.040] [0.063] [0.067] [0.091] [0.071] [0.072]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.332** -0.256* -0.189** 0.110 0.021 -0.060 -0.050 -0.127
[0.120] [0.127] [0.073] [0.226] [0.133] [0.108] [0.100] [0.227]
a daily market in wave 1 0.049 0.022 0.086** 0.031 -0.127** -0.070 -0.011 -0.072
[0.066] [0.057] [0.039] [0.062] [0.057] [0.067] [0.055] [0.062]
public transportation -0.069 -0.066 -0.037 -0.084 -0.212** -0.049 -0.108* -0.117
passed in wave 1 [0.070] [0.083] [0.086] [0.079] [0.088] [0.062] [0.056] [0.090]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.229*** 0.083 -0.052 0.098 0.146* 0.053 0.023 0.047
[0.053] [0.064] [0.049] [0.086] [0.076] [0.088] [0.074] [0.058]
Village allowing a widow's -0.355*** -0.227*** -0.209*** -0.417*** 0.037 0.105 0.108 -0.036
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.064] [0.076] [0.066] [0.076] [0.106] [0.078] [0.084] [0.070]
Village allowing a widow's -0.241** -0.055 0.152** 0.038 -0.034 0.090* -0.052 -0.041
house inheritance in wave X [0.105] [0.067] [0.067] [0.148] [0.123] [0.048] [0.057] [0.177]
Constant 0.653 0.938* 0.521 0.391 -0.134 -0.032 -0.142 -0.731
[0.469] [0.496] [0.480] [0.723] [0.694] [0.376] [0.469] [0.880]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of predicted probability outside the unit interval
0.149 0.149 0.167 0.144 0.065 0.071 0.073 0.100
R-squared 0.474 0.471 0.507 0.492 0.309 0.289 0.299 0.371
No. of obs. 268 294 292 249 410 445 409 328
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table 5: Impacts of Inheritance Right to Land with a Control of Village Fixed E®ects
Dependent variable: One if get married between waves X and 5
Sample: Non-migrant males (5-18) and all females (3-15)
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Male £
Remove discrimination regarding 0.267** 0.457*** 0.452*** 0.471***
a widow's land inheritance [0.126] [0.084] [0.048] [0.057]
between waves X and 5
Male -0.082 0.135 0.013 0.079
[0.252] [0.241] [0.207] [0.222]
Age (years) in wave X 0.135*** 0.170*** 0.111** 0.160***
[0.033] [0.036] [0.043] [0.045]
Age squared in wave X -0.005** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.005**
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Education (years) in wave X -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.035*
[0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019]
Height (cm) in wave X 0.000 0.004 0.008* 0.002
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Weight (kg) in wave X 0.006 -0.006 -0.002 0.006
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
Father's education (years) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.012
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]
Mother's education (years) -0.020 -0.025** -0.016 -0.034***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010]
Father died before a -0.031 -0.088* -0.119* -0.056
respondent being aged 15 [0.074] [0.048] [0.059] [0.058]
Mother died before a 0.098** -0.015 0.043 0.040
respondent being aged 15 [0.047] [0.053] [0.053] [0.065]
Head's tribe = Largest -0.085 -0.001 -0.035 -0.068
ethnic group in a [0.128] [0.075] [0.085] [0.102]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside 0.024 -0.504*** -0.487*** -0.261**
a village in wave X [0.051] [0.080] [0.157] [0.098]
Head's age in wave X -0.001 0.003** 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Head Muslim in wave X 0.059 0.004 -0.032 0.001
[0.085] [0.066] [0.093] [0.079]
No. of HH male members 0.045* 0.051** 0.029 0.036
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.024] [0.020] [0.026] [0.025]
No. of HH female members 0.028 0.026 0.024 -0.008
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.024] [0.023] [0.027] [0.026]
HH size in wave X -0.029** -0.022** -0.018 -0.007
[0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.011]
Log of cultivated 0.034 -0.043 0.001 -0.023
land (acre) in wave X [0.031] [0.030] [0.033] [0.028]
Male
£ Age in wave X 0.004 -0.107* -0.079 -0.052
[0.061] [0.054] [0.049] [0.062]
£ Age squared in wave X -0.000 0.004** 0.003 0.002
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
£ Education (years) in wave X 0.025 0.031 0.039 0.064**
[0.034] [0.034] [0.026] [0.024]
£ Height (cm) in wave X -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.002
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005]
£ Weight (kg) in wave X 0.006 0.014 -0.002 0.001
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
£ Father's education -0.014 -0.009 -0.008 -0.027**
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012]
£ Mother's education -0.019 -0.017 -0.022 -0.015
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015]
£ Father died before a 0.089 0.155** 0.132 0.038
respondent being aged 15 [0.094] [0.068] [0.079] [0.092]
£ Mother died before a -0.077 0.013 -0.028 -0.159
respondent being aged 15 [0.079] [0.095] [0.082] [0.112]
£ Head's tribe = Largest 0.007 -0.037 0.043 0.140
ethnic group in a [0.115] [0.106] [0.094] [0.129]
village in wave 1
£ HH head born outside -0.071 0.521 0.193 0.506**
a community in wave X [0.085] [0.668] [0.290] [0.203]
£ Head's age in wave X 0.001 -0.004* -0.005* -0.001
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
£ Head Muslim in wave X -0.074 -0.046 -0.010 -0.256**
[0.096] [0.072] [0.102] [0.113]
£ No. of HH male members 0.022 -0.030 0.045 0.072*
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.039] [0.029] [0.036] [0.036]
£ No. of HH female members 0.006 -0.027 -0.015 0.084*
aged 3 to 15 [0.041] [0.035] [0.041] [0.041]
£ HH size in wave X -0.004 0.022 0.004 -0.044**
[0.019] [0.016] [0.022] [0.019]
£ Log of cultivated 0.004 0.053 0.010 0.011
land (acre) in wave X [0.051] [0.045] [0.040] [0.039]
£ Log of population in -0.020 -0.061 -0.048 -0.023
a village in wave X [0.049] [0.060] [0.046] [0.047]
£ Village formed by -0.002 -0.021 0.072 0.047
the villagization in the 1970's [0.100] [0.115] [0.078] [0.101]
£ Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.188 -0.068 0.022 0.140
[0.206] [0.153] [0.111] [0.217]
a daily market in wave 1 0.063 0.036 0.061 0.097
[0.096] [0.072] [0.074] [0.087]
public transportation -0.019 -0.009 0.097 0.069
passed in wave 1 [0.109] [0.080] [0.091] [0.090]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.204* 0.053 -0.046 0.037
[0.113] [0.060] [0.075] [0.076]
£ Village allowing a widow's -0.373** -0.429*** -0.375*** -0.508***
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.142] [0.105] [0.072] [0.076]
£ Village allowing a widow's -0.079 -0.168** 0.132* -0.078
house inheritance in wave X [0.164] [0.071] [0.071] [0.084]
Constant -0.150 -0.277 -0.569 -0.552
[0.325] [0.294] [0.336] [0.497]
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of predicted probability outside the unit interval
0.120 0.125 0.127 0.143
R-squared 0.379 0.387 0.409 0.442
No. of obs. 678 739 701 577
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table 6: Ex-ante and Ex-post Impacts of Inheritance Right to Land (Non-migrant Males Aged 5-18 in Wave 1)
Dependent variable: One if get married between waves X and 5
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
Age in wave 1 5-12 13-18 5-12 13-18 5-12 13-18 5-12 13-18
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Remove discrimination regarding 0.147 0.177 0.202*** 0.416*** 0.157** 0.542*** 0.249*** 0.529***
a widow's land inheritance [0.096] [0.208] [0.067] [0.133] [0.073] [0.109] [0.083] [0.114]
between waves X and 5
Age (years) in wave X 0.002 -0.702 0.114* -0.137 0.005 0.511 0.060 0.065
[0.107] [0.671] [0.065] [0.360] [0.030] [0.495] [0.046] [0.646]
Age squared in wave X 0.002 0.021 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.016 -0.001 -0.004
[0.007] [0.021] [0.002] [0.011] [0.002] [0.015] [0.002] [0.019]
Education (years) in wave X 0.096 0.019 0.108** -0.004 0.090** -0.025 0.013 0.039*
[0.063] [0.031] [0.052] [0.023] [0.033] [0.019] [0.041] [0.020]
Height (cm) in wave X -0.009* 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.016*** 0.011 -0.000 -0.007
[0.004] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011]
Weight (kg) in wave X 0.032** 0.012 -0.003 0.010 -0.026** 0.003 0.005 0.017*
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.009]
Father's education (years) -0.010 -0.011 -0.003 -0.037** -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 -0.030
[0.011] [0.019] [0.012] [0.016] [0.008] [0.023] [0.009] [0.028]
Mother's education (years) -0.041*** -0.041** -0.023 -0.055** -0.021* -0.046** -0.050*** -0.034
[0.013] [0.019] [0.015] [0.021] [0.010] [0.017] [0.015] [0.020]
Father died before a 0.070 0.073 0.050 0.027 0.006 -0.002 -0.086 0.005
respondent being aged 15 [0.063] [0.177] [0.055] [0.084] [0.062] [0.124] [0.077] [0.197]
Mother died before a -0.058 0.009 -0.087 0.124 -0.039 0.092 -0.059 -0.117
respondent being aged 15 [0.081] [0.165] [0.074] [0.179] [0.061] [0.130] [0.139] [0.181]
Head's tribe = Largest 0.109 -0.042 0.028 -0.113 0.048 0.006 0.151 -0.072
ethnic group in a [0.099] [0.230] [0.113] [0.242] [0.053] [0.258] [0.111] [0.201]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside -0.012 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.384 0.131 0.000
a village in wave X [0.075] [0.086] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.330] [0.114] [0.000]
Head's age in wave X 0.003* -0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.000 -0.008 0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008]
Head Muslim in wave X -0.094 0.252*** -0.061 0.140 -0.078 0.151 -0.166 -0.757***
[0.085] [0.080] [0.061] [0.180] [0.055] [0.197] [0.103] [0.216]
No. of HH male members 0.067 0.026 0.024 0.015 0.072*** 0.097** 0.111*** 0.011
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.046] [0.061] [0.028] [0.048] [0.026] [0.046] [0.036] [0.046]
No. of HH female members 0.030 0.031 -0.004 0.022 0.005 0.025 0.054 0.069
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.040] [0.030] [0.032] [0.037] [0.028] [0.052] [0.032] [0.058]
HH size in wave X -0.036 -0.030 -0.010 -0.004 -0.012 -0.041 -0.043** -0.031
[0.023] [0.026] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.031] [0.017] [0.034]
Log of cultivated 0.023 0.030 -0.013 -0.007 -0.005 0.059 -0.040 0.024
land (acre) in wave X [0.040] [0.082] [0.039] [0.065] [0.036] [0.073] [0.041] [0.065]
Log of population in -0.150 -0.035 -0.164** 0.041 -0.055 -0.056 -0.075 -0.240*
a village in wave X [0.106] [0.153] [0.080] [0.120] [0.060] [0.103] [0.109] [0.123]
Village formed by -0.244*** 0.119 -0.027 0.086 0.011 0.232** 0.018 0.234
the villagization in the 1970's [0.070] [0.196] [0.094] [0.125] [0.063] [0.112] [0.067] [0.159]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.052 -1.062*** -0.046 -0.818*** -0.102 -0.413 0.295 0.183
[0.191] [0.345] [0.127] [0.281] [0.080] [0.259] [0.315] [0.352]
a daily market in wave 1 0.008 0.141 0.044 0.077 0.102* 0.013 0.060 -0.100
[0.089] [0.195] [0.092] [0.148] [0.053] [0.090] [0.059] [0.105]
public transportation -0.070 0.186 -0.012 0.158 -0.031 0.056 -0.122 -0.148
passed in wave 1 [0.126] [0.193] [0.087] [0.166] [0.078] [0.194] [0.092] [0.132]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.194** 0.171 0.005 0.036 -0.044 -0.111 -0.040 0.255*
[0.080] [0.160] [0.097] [0.155] [0.059] [0.147] [0.093] [0.144]
Village allowing a widow's -0.297** -0.424** -0.208* -0.467*** -0.082 -0.523*** -0.239* -0.508***
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.124] [0.189] [0.110] [0.157] [0.098] [0.115] [0.123] [0.133]
Village allowing a widow's -0.249 -0.246 -0.166** -0.009 -0.027 0.357** 0.060 0.396
house inheritance in wave X [0.155] [0.181] [0.073] [0.122] [0.090] [0.166] [0.193] [0.355]
Constant 1.977** 6.809 1.119 1.701 -0.549 -3.432 0.266 3.346
[0.912] [4.896] [0.787] [3.266] [0.466] [4.574] [0.938] [5.833]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of predicted probability outside the unit interval
0.242 0.171 0.181 0.168 0.223 0.178 0.214 0.209
R-squared 0.456 0.433 0.393 0.464 0.433 0.480 0.407 0.592
No. of obs. 169 99 187 107 197 95 168 81
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table 7: Land Heterogeneity (Non-migrant Males Aged 5-18 in Wave 1)
Dependent variable: One if get married between waves X and 5
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Remove discrimination regarding 0.221** - 0.193** - 0.302*** - 0.468*** -
a widow's land inheritance [0.084] [0.077] [0.051] [0.072]
between waves X and 5
Log of cultivated land (acre) in wave X 0.046 0.065 -0.065 -0.014 0.052 0.069 0.277*** 0.252***
£ Remove discrimination regarding [0.070] [0.077] [0.061] [0.106] [0.080] [0.102] [0.086] [0.085]
a widow's land inheritance
between waves X and 5
Age (years) in wave X 0.121** 0.121** 0.070* 0.077* 0.016 0.023 0.121** 0.119**
[0.046] [0.049] [0.039] [0.041] [0.031] [0.034] [0.046] [0.047]
Age squared in wave X -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004** -0.003**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Education (years) in wave X 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.002 0.022 0.021 0.028 0.028
[0.023] [0.024] [0.019] [0.022] [0.017] [0.019] [0.017] [0.020]
Height (cm) in wave X -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.013*** 0.012*** -0.002 -0.003
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Weight (kg) in wave X 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.009 -0.006 -0.005 0.012* 0.009
[0.009] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007]
Father's education (years) -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
Mother's education (years) -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.046*** -0.043***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Father died before a 0.075 0.068 0.047 0.074* 0.014 0.047 -0.021 -0.000
respondent being aged 15 [0.055] [0.057] [0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.049] [0.052] [0.058]
Mother died before a 0.004 -0.007 0.007 0.003 0.017 0.016 -0.126 -0.120
respondent being aged 15 [0.063] [0.069] [0.070] [0.075] [0.064] [0.069] [0.097] [0.104]
Head's tribe = Largest 0.059 0.051 0.056 0.109 0.047 0.041 0.113 0.173*
ethnic group in a [0.140] [0.161] [0.086] [0.106] [0.079] [0.087] [0.094] [0.099]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside -0.037 -0.016 0.000 0.000 -0.458*** -0.391*** 0.345*** 0.352***
a village in wave X [0.057] [0.060] [0.000] [0.000] [0.119] [0.135] [0.089] [0.088]
Head's age in wave X -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Head Muslim in wave X 0.004 0.065 -0.060 -0.019 -0.054 -0.063 -0.268*** -0.179*
[0.069] [0.074] [0.047] [0.058] [0.049] [0.060] [0.088] [0.094]
No. of HH male members 0.047 0.049 0.022 0.015 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.103*** 0.090***
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.037] [0.042] [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.027] [0.029]
No. of HH female members 0.015 0.026 -0.005 0.003 0.012 0.014 0.066** 0.070**
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.026] [0.028] [0.024] [0.026] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.029]
HH size in wave X -0.027* -0.033* -0.004 0.001 -0.016 -0.019 -0.047*** -0.048***
[0.014] [0.017] [0.012] [0.013] [0.017] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016]
Log of cultivated 0.036 -0.020 0.006 0.009 0.000 -0.039 -0.012 -0.249***
land (acre) in wave X [0.040] [0.060] [0.028] [0.094] [0.036] [0.083] [0.029] [0.082]
Log of population in -0.059 - -0.122* - -0.098* - -0.100 -
a village in wave X [0.046] [0.061] [0.049] [0.082]
Village formed by -0.123** - 0.020 - 0.071* - 0.091 -
the villagization in the 1970's [0.050] [0.063] [0.040] [0.063]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.337** - -0.258** - -0.204** - 0.102 -
[0.123] [0.122] [0.077] [0.226]
a daily market in wave 1 0.055 - 0.018 - 0.091** - 0.032 -
[0.068] [0.058] [0.041] [0.062]
public transportation -0.066 - -0.072 - -0.033 - -0.084 -
passed in wave 1 [0.071] [0.085] [0.088] [0.080]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.222*** - 0.088 - -0.056 - 0.100 -
[0.056] [0.065] [0.050] [0.086]
Village allowing a widow's -0.361*** - -0.195** - -0.223*** - -0.428*** -
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.066] [0.075] [0.066] [0.076]
Village allowing a widow's -0.242** - -0.044 - 0.152** - 0.032 -
house inheritance in wave X [0.108] [0.070] [0.067] [0.145]
Constant 0.654 -0.043 0.988* -0.296 0.499 -0.637* 0.190 -0.455
[0.474] [0.387] [0.494] [0.373] [0.481] [0.375] [0.742] [0.514]
District FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Village FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Proportion of predicted probability outside the unit interval
0.136 0.164 0.153 0193 0.167 0.192 0.140 0.200
R-squared 0.475 0.498 0.472 0.504 0.508 0.529 0.495 0.535
No. of obs. 268 268 294 294 292 301 249 255
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) The demeaned log of cultivated
land area and Dj are interacted in columns (a), (c), (e), and (g).
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Table 8: Appendix: Considerations when Choosing a Husband
(1) Own age (maturity) 0.91
(2) A husband's age (similarity, maturity) 0.83
(3) A husband's education 0.63
(4) A husband belongs to a di®erent clan 0.91
(5) A husband is in the same ethnic group 0.83
(6) A husband has no other wives 0.91
(7) A husband has the same religion 0.83
(8) A husband's family is rich 0.69
(9) A husband's family allows a widow to inherit a husband's properties 0.63
(10) A husband's family is `good' in the sense that
No witchcraft practices 0.88
No criminals 0.88
No ill members 0.80
Notes: (1) The observations were 36 females aged 30-40 years in 2012. (2) The number is the proportion.
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Table 9: Appendix: An Individual's Hours Worked and Crop Choices in Wave 1
Dependent variables: Log of per worker hours worked (weekly) on The share of cash
Self-employed chore crops (relative to
farming activities the sum of cash
and food crops)
in HH production
Male Female Male Female Male Female
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Remove discrimination regarding -0.095 0.182 -0.035 0.001 -0.080 -0.043
a widow's land inheritance [0.085] [0.120] [0.145] [0.060] [0.093] [0.120]
between waves 1 and 5
Age (years) in wave 1 0.012 0.056*** 0.013 0.035*** -0.008* 0.000
[0.021] [0.009] [0.022] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004]
Age squared in wave 1 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Education (years) in wave 1 -0.015 0.014 -0.026 0.024* 0.007 -0.005
[0.016] [0.021] [0.023] [0.013] [0.005] [0.006]
Height (cm) in wave 1 0.010 -0.000 0.018*** 0.022*** -0.000 -0.003
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
Weight (kg) in wave 1 0.005 0.005 -0.022** -0.008* -0.000 0.003
[0.007] [0.005] [0.011] [0.005] [0.003] [0.002]
Father's education (years) 0.008 0.010 0.012 -0.003 -0.012*** -0.009*
[0.012] [0.013] [0.016] [0.010] [0.003] [0.005]
Mother's education (years) -0.014 -0.005 -0.006 -0.018 -0.012** -0.004
[0.017] [0.012] [0.015] [0.013] [0.005] [0.006]
Father died before a -0.010 -0.127 0.062 -0.143 0.020 -0.036
respondent being aged 15 [0.070] [0.096] [0.118] [0.087] [0.031] [0.026]
Mother died before a 0.091 0.159* 0.145 0.055 -0.031 -0.025
respondent being aged 15 [0.078] [0.090] [0.150] [0.088] [0.033] [0.034]
Head's tribe = Largest 0.031 0.149 0.218 0.168 0.134** 0.121**
ethnic group in a [0.158] [0.123] [0.211] [0.148] [0.051] [0.057]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside 0.009 0.131 0.038 0.059 -0.070 -0.107**
a village in wave 1 [0.070] [0.080] [0.124] [0.065] [0.047] [0.046]
Head's age in wave 1 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002** 0.003***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Head Muslim in wave 1 0.161 0.120 0.345*** 0.131 -0.089 -0.049
[0.123] [0.196] [0.117] [0.130] [0.055] [0.074]
No. of HH male members -0.012 -0.088** -0.009 0.032 0.003 0.016
aged 3 to 15 in wave 1 [0.064] [0.035] [0.067] [0.030] [0.018] [0.019]
No. of HH female members -0.012 -0.055* -0.023 0.027 0.006 0.006
aged 3 to 15 in wave 1 [0.053] [0.031] [0.053] [0.031] [0.015] [0.012]
HH size in wave 1 -0.010 0.003 -0.013 -0.037* 0.011 -0.005
[0.034] [0.020] [0.034] [0.018] [0.013] [0.012]
Log of cultivated 0.204*** 0.106** -0.203*** -0.158*** 0.004 0.032
land (acre) in wave 1 [0.066] [0.047] [0.052] [0.046] [0.018] [0.022]
Log of population in -0.257*** -0.090 0.289** -0.061 0.004 0.001
a village in wave 1 [0.087] [0.126] [0.125] [0.061] [0.065] [0.087]
Village formed by -0.195*** -0.322*** -0.082 -0.101 -0.131** -0.161**
the villagization in the 1970's [0.067] [0.097] [0.147] [0.071] [0.061] [0.072]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.579*** -0.301 -0.787*** -0.032 0.108 0.064
[0.170] [0.305] [0.275] [0.138] [0.113] [0.172]
a daily market in wave 1 0.001 -0.108 0.107 0.082 -0.034 -0.102
[0.078] [0.123] [0.149] [0.065] [0.077] [0.095]
public transportation 0.474*** -0.024 0.463*** 0.179** 0.032 -0.121
passed in wave 1 [0.120] [0.143] [0.139] [0.086] [0.076] [0.096]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.089 0.319** -0.042 0.189** 0.058 0.112
[0.091] [0.143] [0.141] [0.086] [0.058] [0.081]
Village allowing a widow's -0.511*** -0.085 -0.390 -0.354*** -0.027 -0.088
house inheritance in wave 1 [0.111] [0.164] [0.230] [0.091] [0.096] [0.137]
Constant 2.905*** 2.188* -1.640 0.249 -1.640 0.249
[0.859] [1.146] [1.181] [0.729] [1.181] [0.729]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.312 0.293 0.107 0.267 0.239 0.216
No. of obs. 403 542 427 634 605 727
(1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) Chore activities consist of collecting
¯rewood, fetching water, caring for ill household members, preparing meals, cleaning houses, doing laundry, and
shopping for food. (4) Co®ee, cotton, tea, and tobacco are classi¯ed as cash crops, whereas banana, beans, cassava,
and maize are classi¯ed as food crops. (5) Sample respondents included in the estimations were 7 years or older in
wave 1.
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Table 10: Appendix: Correlation between Marriage and Migration
Dependent variable: One if married in wave 5
Sample: All Only single at baseline
Male Female Male Female
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Migrate between 0.008 0.372*** 0.019 0.462***
waves 1 and 5 (dummy) [0.029] [0.028] [0.034] [0.026]
Married in wave 1 0.536*** 0.376*** - -
(dummy) [0.019] [0.030]
Constant 0.457*** 0.273*** 0.452*** 0.268***
[0.010] [0.018] [0.009] [0.013]
Initial village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.231 0.213 0.044 0.261
No. of obs. 1788 1901 1406 1443
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each original village. (3) Columns (a) and (b)
exploit all panel individuals with a control of marital status in wave 1, whereas columns (c) and (d) limit the sample
only to those who were single in wave 1.
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Table 11: Appendix: Inheritance Right and Welfare Shocks (Non-migrant Males Aged 5-18 in
Wave 1)
Dependent variables: Growth from wave X to 5 of: One if
Log of per capita income (weekly) Log of per capita consumption (annual) positive
income
shocks
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4 X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4 X = 4
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Remove discrimination regarding -0.318 0.173 0.030 0.229 -0.082 0.144 0.183 0.154 0.065
a widow's land inheritance [0.505] [0.226] [0.132] [0.193] [0.233] [0.237] [0.174] [0.195] [0.068]
between waves X and 5
Age (years) in wave X -0.083 -0.211* 0.150 0.146 -0.031 -0.055 0.021 0.036 -0.040
[0.106] [0.118] [0.141] [0.125] [0.089] [0.081] [0.080] [0.086] [0.046]
Age squared in wave X 0.005 0.010** -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Education (years) in wave X -0.049 -0.078 -0.046 0.019 -0.062 -0.073* 0.008 -0.020 0.022
[0.058] [0.055] [0.041] [0.047] [0.047] [0.037] [0.028] [0.039] [0.014]
Height (cm) in wave X 0.016 0.025 -0.001 -0.022 0.021* 0.010 0.006 -0.009 0.005
[0.013] [0.017] [0.016] [0.021] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008] [0.006]
Weight (kg) in wave X -0.018 -0.037* -0.007 0.011 -0.036* -0.012 -0.013 0.000 -0.003
[0.020] [0.021] [0.017] [0.022] [0.018] [0.014] [0.013] [0.011] [0.006]
Father's education (years) 0.020 -0.018 0.019 0.009 -0.004 -0.003 0.026 0.008 -0.005
[0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.021] [0.023] [0.030] [0.025] [0.033] [0.010]
Mother's education (years) -0.017 -0.005 0.003 0.029 -0.020 -0.018 -0.035 -0.015 -0.012
[0.033] [0.035] [0.041] [0.040] [0.024] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.017]
Father died before a -0.153 0.087 0.147 0.423* 0.103 0.039 0.066 0.212 -0.003
respondent being aged 15 [0.199] [0.194] [0.161] [0.233] [0.128] [0.123] [0.157] [0.195] [0.056]
Mother died before a 0.216 -0.062 -0.015 0.058 0.071 0.004 -0.051 -0.080 -0.054
respondent being aged 15 [0.197] [0.240] [0.160] [0.245] [0.106] [0.139] [0.159] [0.180] [0.092]
Head's tribe = Largest 1.143*** 0.298 0.534* -0.037 0.262 0.336 0.081 -0.071 -0.018
ethnic group in a [0.221] [0.370] [0.281] [0.452] [0.184] [0.202] [0.115] [0.334] [0.113]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside -0.172 0.000 0.446 0.687 -0.173* 0.000 -0.001 -0.206 0.000
a village in wave X [0.143] [0.000] [0.364] [0.438] [0.091] [0.000] [0.269] [0.511] [0.000]
Head's age in wave X 0.005 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.008* 0.008** 0.003 0.002
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Head Muslim in wave X 0.028 -0.134 0.592** 0.096 0.089 0.007 0.257 -0.142 0.001
[0.262] [0.244] [0.260] [0.384] [0.167] [0.207] [0.203] [0.161] [0.114]
No. of HH male members 0.299*** 0.187* 0.044 0.116 0.122* 0.139*** 0.040 0.029 -0.020
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.068] [0.106] [0.079] [0.093] [0.069] [0.048] [0.053] [0.049] [0.029]
No. of HH female members 0.105 0.195** 0.167** 0.182*** 0.059 0.115** 0.046 0.056 -0.002
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.068] [0.074] [0.066] [0.061] [0.052] [0.043] [0.037] [0.053] [0.034]
HH size in wave X -0.119** -0.035 -0.060 -0.056 -0.057 -0.039 -0.028 -0.013 -0.011
[0.049] [0.041] [0.046] [0.043] [0.037] [0.026] [0.032] [0.021] [0.015]
Log of cultivated -0.281** -0.223** -0.236** -0.300** -0.044 -0.101 -0.204*** -0.227** 0.004
land (acre) in wave X [0.107] [0.099] [0.097] [0.119] [0.075] [0.076] [0.066] [0.100] [0.028]
Log of population in -0.107 -0.128 -0.027 -0.571* 0.193 -0.165 -0.075 0.164 -0.006
a village in wave X [0.318] [0.184] [0.110] [0.286] [0.214] [0.192] [0.125] [0.256] [0.088]
Village formed by 0.123 0.213 0.040 0.404** 0.278 0.374 0.149 0.228 -0.027
the villagization in the 1970's [0.355] [0.142] [0.110] [0.194] [0.284] [0.253] [0.198] [0.306] [0.057]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.443 -0.505* -1.134*** 1.289** -0.529 -0.248 -0.455** -0.353 -0.021
[0.605] [0.276] [0.303] [0.492] [0.493] [0.281] [0.221] [0.618] [0.170]
a daily market in wave 1 0.200 0.128 0.420*** -0.176 0.159 0.107 0.322*** -0.017 -0.065
[0.402] [0.164] [0.127] [0.170] [0.212] [0.193] [0.114] [0.128] [0.055]
public transportation -0.199 -0.130 -0.187 -0.266 -0.159 -0.231 -0.130 -0.117 -0.107
passed in wave 1 [0.307] [0.166] [0.182] [0.230] [0.263] [0.206] [0.174] [0.199] [0.100]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.396 0.226 -0.211 0.146 0.110 0.066 -0.099 -0.085 0.144
[0.268] [0.214] [0.155] [0.273] [0.169] [0.160] [0.171] [0.206] [0.092]
Village allowing a widow's 1.021*** 0.016 0.336* 0.120 0.178 0.016 0.139 -0.180 -0.079
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.324] [0.206] [0.174] [0.275] [0.214] [0.278] [0.194] [0.153] [0.116]
Village allowing a widow's 0.196 -0.208 0.903*** 0.590 -0.026 -0.090 0.362* -0.797 -0.125
house inheritance in wave X [0.543] [0.211] [0.168] [0.612] [0.264] [0.379] [0.179] [0.693] [0.177]
Constant -0.833 -0.479 0.085 4.370* -3.065 0.211 0.008 0.231 0.091
[3.099] [1.525] [1.328] [2.165] [1.899] [1.694] [1.295] [1.502] [0.725]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.269 0.210 0.207 0.194 0.213 0.171 0.172 0.215 0.123
No. of obs. 262 284 279 243 268 294 292 249 189
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A dummy for positive income shocks
takes one if respondents aged 20 years or older in wave 5 enjoyed high income in any year between 1994 and 2003
due to high crop prices, bumper harvests, livestock activities, wage employment, o®-farm employment, remittances,
gifts and support by organizations, returns to other assets (e.g., land rental), and others (e.g., inheritance).
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Table 12: Appendix: Inheritance Right and Crop Choices (Non-migrant Males Aged 5-18 in Wave
1)
Dependent variable: Growth from wave X to wave 5 of:
share of cash crops (relative to the sum
of cash and food crops) in HH production
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Remove discrimination regarding 0.149** 0.125* 0.010 0.224**
a widow's land inheritance [0.070] [0.069] [0.051] [0.088]
between waves X and 5
Age (years) in wave X -0.001 0.053 0.062 0.094
[0.048] [0.052] [0.039] [0.055]
Age squared in wave X 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Education (years) in wave X -0.016 0.008 -0.022 0.013
[0.025] [0.020] [0.015] [0.021]
Height (cm) in wave X -0.002 -0.012** -0.008* -0.016*
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008]
Weight (kg) in wave X 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.013*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006]
Father's education (years) 0.007 -0.007 0.018* -0.003
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Mother's education (years) 0.004 0.028* -0.004 0.009
[0.009] [0.015] [0.012] [0.017]
Father died before a -0.039 0.006 -0.033 0.026
respondent being aged 15 [0.059] [0.057] [0.061] [0.075]
Mother died before a -0.045 -0.100 -0.010 -0.048
respondent being aged 15 [0.068] [0.075] [0.065] [0.093]
Head's tribe = Largest -0.221*** -0.084 0.168 -0.010
ethnic group in a [0.072] [0.099] [0.120] [0.143]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.083
a village in wave X [0.056] [0.000] [0.171] [0.255]
Head's age in wave X -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Head Muslim in wave X 0.121 -0.066 -0.002 -0.353*
[0.098] [0.095] [0.135] [0.204]
No. of HH male members -0.007 0.034 -0.017 -0.022
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.039] [0.028] [0.034] [0.047]
No. of HH female members -0.040 0.021 0.026 -0.070
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.043] [0.034] [0.031] [0.046]
HH size in wave X 0.023 -0.023 0.002 0.020
[0.024] [0.015] [0.020] [0.023]
Log of cultivated 0.025 0.056 -0.032 0.061
land (acre) in wave X [0.038] [0.051] [0.043] [0.052]
Log of population in 0.080 -0.180** -0.057 -0.383**
a village in wave X [0.101] [0.083] [0.063] [0.175]
Village formed by 0.090 -0.207* 0.028 -0.168
the villagization in the 1970's [0.064] [0.110] [0.061] [0.122]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -0.109 0.392*** 0.416*** 0.475
[0.179] [0.132] [0.127] [0.333]
a daily market in wave 1 -0.119 0.065 -0.076 -0.104
[0.093] [0.083] [0.057] [0.097]
public transportation -0.139 -0.127 -0.103 -0.150
passed in wave 1 [0.091] [0.116] [0.086] [0.135]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 0.102 0.060 -0.184*** 0.360***
[0.092] [0.074] [0.056] [0.115]
Village allowing a widow's 0.037 0.022 -0.146** 0.041
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.085] [0.066] [0.067] [0.112]
Village allowing a widow's 0.140 -0.018 -0.152 0.048
house inheritance in wave X [0.131] [0.097] [0.094] [0.327]
Constant -0.590 1.738** 0.938 3.910***
[0.939] [0.759] [0.673] [1.379]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.138 0.184 0.206 0.298
No. of obs. 245 255 265 220
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) Co®ee, cotton, tea, and
tobacco are classi¯ed as cash crops, whereas banana, beans, cassava, and maize are classi¯ed as food crops.
46
Table 13: Appendix: Inheritance Right and Mortality Shocks (Non-migrant Males Aged 5-18 in
Wave 1)
Dependent variables: Growth from wave X to 5 of log of One if
per capita expenditures (annual) associated health
with household members' illness and death shocks
X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4 X = 4
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Remove discrimination regarding 0.802 0.509 0.363 -1.057** 0.023
a widow's land inheritance [1.144] [0.700] [0.510] [0.499] [0.070]
between waves X and 5
Age (years) in wave X 0.054 0.312 -0.018 0.022 0.057
[0.260] [0.238] [0.204] [0.286] [0.043]
Age squared in wave X -0.002 -0.017** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.001]
Education (years) in wave X 0.020 0.080 0.056 0.202* 0.010
[0.169] [0.097] [0.100] [0.112] [0.017]
Height (cm) in wave X 0.033 0.014 0.021 0.061 -0.011**
[0.040] [0.032] [0.024] [0.041] [0.005]
Weight (kg) in wave X -0.042 0.002 -0.040 -0.104** 0.011
[0.046] [0.040] [0.032] [0.045] [0.007]
Father's education (years) -0.037 0.002 -0.136** -0.117 -0.012
[0.086] [0.051] [0.065] [0.083] [0.018]
Mother's education (years) 0.168* 0.095 0.133* 0.169* 0.003
[0.092] [0.060] [0.077] [0.085] [0.014]
Father died before a 0.002 -0.009 -0.027 -0.056 0.016
respondent being aged 15 [0.356] [0.371] [0.293] [0.356] [0.067]
Mother died before a 0.482 0.151 -0.614 -0.401 -0.101
respondent being aged 15 [0.479] [0.349] [0.428] [0.546] [0.082]
Head's tribe = Largest -1.292 -0.854 0.156 -0.121 0.138
ethnic group in a [0.902] [0.634] [0.422] [0.277] [0.147]
village in wave 1
HH head born outside -0.277 0.000 0.990 -0.274 0.000
a village in wave X [0.372] [0.000] [0.777] [1.148] [0.000]
Head's age in wave X 0.000 0.020 0.011 0.009 0.010***
[0.011] [0.014] [0.013] [0.018] [0.003]
Head Muslim in wave X -0.800 0.019 0.709 -0.703 -0.131
[0.546] [0.355] [0.526] [0.558] [0.082]
No. of HH male members 0.072 0.076 -0.150 0.152 0.045*
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.294] [0.133] [0.207] [0.179] [0.026]
No. of HH female members 0.042 0.313** -0.051 -0.088 0.046**
aged 3 to 15 in wave X [0.254] [0.121] [0.145] [0.143] [0.022]
HH size in wave X -0.152 -0.036 0.096 0.089 -0.033***
[0.162] [0.062] [0.103] [0.085] [0.009]
Log of cultivated 0.282 -0.430** -0.730*** -0.471 -0.015
land (acre) in wave X [0.246] [0.174] [0.263] [0.335] [0.037]
Log of population in 0.262 -0.493* -0.162 -0.511 0.126*
a village in wave X [0.533] [0.286] [0.465] [0.550] [0.063]
Village formed by -0.590 0.219 -0.746 0.372 -0.067
the villagization in the 1970's [0.650] [0.355] [0.597] [0.554] [0.069]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 -1.338 0.917 -1.754** 1.764 -0.171
[1.123] [0.731] [0.747] [1.112] [0.153]
a daily market in wave 1 -0.612 0.182 0.386 0.062 -0.046
[0.559] [0.372] [0.450] [0.371] [0.056]
public transportation 0.949 -1.091** -0.295 -0.742 -0.010
passed in wave 1 [0.670] [0.501] [0.472] [0.545] [0.092]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 -0.017 0.117 0.157 -0.134 0.044
[0.617] [0.477] [0.556] [0.624] [0.073]
Village allowing a widow's -0.615 0.514 0.579 -0.310 -0.108
house inheritance in wave 5 [1.198] [0.721] [0.706] [0.479] [0.095]
Village allowing a widow's -0.538 1.347*** 0.323 2.289** -0.441**
house inheritance in wave X [0.776] [0.456] [0.531] [0.995] [0.159]
Constant -4.968 -0.808 0.972 0.881 -0.477
[5.520] [3.090] [3.916] [4.806] [0.653]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.144 0.204 0.200 0.263 0.261
No. of obs. 217 256 251 205 189
Notes: (1) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A dummy for health shocks
takes one if respondents aged 20 years or older in wave 5 experienced income or asset losses in any year between
1994 and 2003 due to household members' death or serious illness.
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Table 14: Appendix: Inheritance Right and Infrastructure Improvements
Dependent variables: One if a village has in wave 5
a bank a daily public a bar/
market trasportation restaurant
passed
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Remove discrimination regarding -0.115 -0.382 -0.822** -0.361
a widow's land inheritance [0.094] [0.314] [0.325] [0.482]
between waves 1 and 5
Log of population in -0.076 0.031 -0.162 0.057
a village in wave 1 [0.066] [0.373] [0.359] [0.294]
Village formed by 0.127 -0.414 -0.286 -0.182
the villagization in the 1970's [0.098] [0.243] [0.263] [0.148]
Village having
a bank in wave 1 0.785** 0.126 -0.194 0.735
[0.289] [0.715] [0.581] [0.471]
a daily market in wave 1 0.146 0.078 0.383 0.123
[0.107] [0.455] [0.322] [0.427]
public transportation 0.020 -0.073 0.448 0.160
passed in wave 1 [0.072] [0.591] [0.448] [0.420]
a bar or restaurant in wave 1 -0.146 -0.169 -0.106 -0.244
[0.103] [0.348] [0.249] [0.360]
Village allowing a widow's 0.059 -0.028 0.437 0.555
house inheritance in wave 5 [0.067] [0.341] [0.324] [0.443]
Village allowing a widow's -0.044 0.377 -0.120 0.256
house inheritance in wave 1 [0.128] [0.690] [0.439] [0.737]
Constant 0.245 0.435 2.700 -0.364
[0.562] [2.748] [2.603] [2.371]
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.886 0.550 0.581 0.598
No. of obs. 26 26 26 26
Notes: (1) Unit of observations is a village. (2) Figures [ ] are standard errors. *** denotes signi¯cance at 1%,
** at 5%, and * at 10%. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each
village.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Wedded Population in Tanzania by Age and Sex
Source: 2002 Population and Housing Census
Note: Wedded population consists of not only those who are formally married irrespective of the type of marriage
but those in consensual unions or socially recognized stable unions.
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Figure 2: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions of Baseline Age of Males below 18 years
old in Wave 1 by Marital Status in Wave 5
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